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PREFACE 
The maintenance of international peace and security is the United 
Nations' most important function and the success or failure of the organ-
ization will be judged by the degree of success achieved in this endeav-
or. The United Nations has dealt with a number of international disputes 
and an analysis of its record should throw some light on both the opera-
tions and the value of the United Nations. In this thesis I will limit 
myself to the study of United Nations' actions in the Kashmir dispute to 
discuss an international action in the field of peaceful settlement. 
Indebtedness is acknowledged first to Dr. Raymond Habiby. my thesis 
adviser, who has worked tirelessly and unceasingly, to assist me in this 
study. I owe an incalculable debt to Dr. Clifford A. L. Rich, who was 
the first to arouse and guide my interest in the political and legal af-
fairs of men and nations. I am grateful to Professor Harold Sare for 
the valuable time he dedicated to the shaping and crystalization of my 
viewpoints. Finally I am indebted to the Department of Political Science 
at Oklahoma State University which, by appointing me as a graduate assis-
tant, made it possible for me to pursue my studies. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On January l, 1948, the Government of India took action to place 
the Kashmir question before the Security Council. In a note submitted 
to the United Nations it invoked Article 35 of the Charter, which autho-
rizes any member to bring to the attention of the Security Council a 
situation the continuance of which would likely endanger thetmainten-
ance of peace and security,! India claimed that the situation existing 
between itself and Pakistan was the result of nationals of Pakistan· and 
of tribesmen from the territory of the Northwest Fronti~s immediately 
adjoining India, and operating from Pakistan, having commenced operations 
,· 2 
against the State of Jammu. and:'.Kashmir, · which had acceded to· India on 
October 27, 1947, and was as sue~ a part of India. 
The Government of Pakistan, in a lengthy communication sent to the 
Security Council on January 15, 19483, emphatically rejected the Indian· 
Government's charges and denied the claim that it was giving aid and 
1unit~ Nations, Security Council Official Records (Security coun-
cil Document 628, January 2, 1948), pp. 139-144, All references to the 
United Nations documents in this thesis will be designated by the letter 
system used by the United Nations itself. Thus Security Council Docu-
ments will be indicated by S/ and Verbatim Records of the Security Coun-
cil (meetings) by S/PV •. 
2Janunu and 'Kashmir is·: the .officially recognized naae of ,:the _State. 
Throughout this study it.will also be referred to as Kashmir. 
3(S/646, January 15, 1948), pp. 67-87. 
1 
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assistance to the invaders. Pakistan conceded that a number of indepen-
dent tribesmen and persons from Pakistan were, as volunteers, helping 
the Kashmir people in their struggle for liberty. Pakistan went further 
to bring to the attention of the Security Council, also under Article 35 
of the Charter, its own charges against India, the most important being: 
l. India was making a persistent attempt to undo the 
, partition scheme of the Indian sub-continent, 
2. A campaign of "genocide" was being carried against 
Muslims in tast Punjab and the Punjab Princely states. 
3. The Indian forces had forcibly and unlawfully oc-
cupied Junagadh and a number of other states, 
4. The accession of the State of Kashmir was obtained 
by "fraud and violence". 
s. India had failed to meet its obligations arising 
from the partition. 
6, Indian action was designed to "destroy the State 
of Pakistan''. 
Thus early in the life of the United Nations, it had to deal with 
another international dispute the continuance of.which could endanger 
international peace and security in that part of the world. In one form 
or another, this problem has occupied the attention of the pnited 
Nations to this day. The fact that the problem is important can readily 
be gathered from statements which a number of leading statesmen have 
made. 
Philip Noel Baker, the British representative in the Security Coun-
cil, told the Council in 1948: "I believe.,,that the Kashmir dispute 
is the ·greatest ··and the gra~est single issue in· international:. 
3 
affairs. 114 De La Tournelle, the representative of France, reite:t>ated 
the same belief by telling the Council in 1948 that "in view of the im-
mense size of the states involved, if the opposing forces were let loose 
the consequences might be incalculable."5 Richard Symonds, the author 
of !h!_ Making .2£. Pakistan, 1950, wrote: " ••• it is the Kashmir dispute 
which has imprisoned every aspect of Indo-Pakistan relations."6 
The record of the Security Council in this matter shows that the 
Council has limited itself to offering its good offices, medi~tion and 
counciliation under the pacific settlement provisions of the Charter, 
and that at no stage has the Council directly sought to resolve the is-
sues between the parties. The Council has only worked out methods and 
plans and recommended them to the parties to use in resolving their dis-
pute. It is clear that the Security Council, having ruled out a military 
decision, wanted the parties to arrive at their own solution by way of a 
' 
peaceful agreement. Aus~in, United States representative in the Security 
Council, clearly expressed this when he said: "The Security Council does 
not have to pass judgment upon any issue of.fact in this dispute beyond i 
the one on which both parties were agreed, and when they passed earnest-
ly."? 
Noel Baker put it this way: " ••• these measures depend on the co-
operation of both parties ••• and without cooperation ••• no plan can work."8 
4(S/PV 284, April 17, 1948), p. 11. 
5 Ibid. , p. 23 • 
6Richard Symonds, !!!!, Making .2£. Pakistan (London, 1949) , p. 154 • 
7 (S/PV 284), p. 18. 
8 . . . 
Ibid., p. 13. 
It is true that while the Security Council is authorized to impose final 
solutions, yet because of the failure to develop its Charter powers, it 
has been limiting itself to proposing recommendations hoping. that they 
would generate a reasonable and impartial settlement accepted by both 
parties to the dispute. 
With this factual and positivist assessment of the United Nations' 
actions, and with the Kashmir question serving as a case-study, this 
study will attempt an analytical examination of the different proposals 
of the.Security Council for resolving the Kashmir dispute in order to 
prove the following hypothesis: Whatever action or lack of action the 
United Nations Security Council has taken was motivated by a desire to 
maintaih a peaceful stalemate between India and Pakistan, a form of 
status-quo, until the issues, whether of fact or law, are settled by 
direct negotiations between the two parties to the dispute. The United 
Nations' action was a result of the conviction that it could not in the 
circumstances resolve the issues,.partly because of the diametrically 
opposed stands and interests of the parties in the Kashmir dispute, and 
partly because of the shortcomings of the United Nations system. 
This study should provide an analytical understanding of United 
Nations' action in handling an international dispute from a positivist 
point of view. It should help to clarify common misconceptions of the 
role of the United Nations, which to me are the result of too optimistic 
or too pessimistic an evaluation of the United Nations and its ability, 
and the belief that it has a will of its own, to impose a solution in a 
specific situation. In the concluding chapter of this thesis, I will 
try to show why I believe the United Nations is of a great value to world 
peace even in the context of its handling of the Kashmir dispute. 
5 
I am aware of the fact that Indian as well as Pakistani scholars 
and politicians might, with all probability, contest my basic hypothesis. 
This would be understandable because their strong involvement in the prob-
lem can easily blind them to the role of the United Nations. It is no 
surprise that both have accused the United Nations of lack of "fairness 
and impartiality". They have, in effect, rejected most, if not all, of 
the United Nations proposals because it has not satisfied their demands. 
The Kashmir problem did not start with the so-called "invasion" of 
Kashmir nor with India's complaint to the Security Council. It started 
way back in the history of the Indian sub-continent; in its partition and 
in the nature of its people. Chapter II will examine the background to 
the problem. Chapter III will deal with the positions and arguments put 
forth by India and Pakistan within the framework of their national inter-
ests in Kashmir. Chapter IV is an account of the events which precipi-
tate the dispute. It was at this stage that the United Nations became 
an element in the dispute and Chapters V, VI, and VII relate what actions 
the United Nations has taken and attempt to explain why they were taken. 
Chapter VIII will analyze and appraise the United Nations' actions and 
relate them to the hypothesis of the thesis. 
Given our international system as it is, can we expect the United 
Nations to have a will of its own regardless of what its members and the 
parties want? This is a problem which is aggravated by the nations' in-
terpretation of the role of the United Nations, the importance and power 
of the parties involved in any dispute and whether they are committed to 
any of the world forces in this divided world. The Kashmir problem does 
not seem to be an exception. Whatever action the United Nations has 
taken seems to have been the only possible and feasible action in the 
6 
over-all situation. 
As to methodology, I will pursue a critical analysis of the litera-
ture in the field. Particula~ly, I am going to study,~in depth; the 
Security Council Documents on the Kashmir dispute, the literature written 
about the United Nations in its efforts to handle the dispute, Indian 
and Pakistani official documents, and the leading newspapers and period-
icals that deal with the problem. 
CHAPTER II 
GENERAL BACKGROUND 
An assessment of the political, cultural, and religious history of 
the Indian sub-continent is essential to the understanding of Pakistani-
Indian relations, as this helps to explain the basic, deep-rooted issues 
that gave rise to the Kashmir dispute. One can say that this complicat-
ed problem goes way back to the early history of the sub-continent and 
its social milieu. 
The arrival of the British in the Indian sub-continent in the mid-. 
dle of the seventeenth century brought about a round about turn in Indian 
history. Why and how. the British succeeded in exercising complete su-
premacy will not be discussed in this thesis as this lies beyond the 
scope of my study. Yet one can say that British supremacy over India 
would have proved much more difficult had it not been for the internal 
decay of the Mogul Empirel brought about by the intensification of the 
conflict between Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs. 
From a factory in Bengal established by the East India Company in 
1650, British control steadily increased so that by 1833, the Crown took 
over and became the effective ruler of India with the Company serving as 
the local managing agency of the Crown. In the year 1858, the 
l 1526-1707 A.D. The Moguls were a Turco-Mongol race from Central 
Asia. The word Mogul, Mugul, Moghal, or Mughul refers to the Arabic 
and Persian form of the word Mongol. 
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Government of India Act deprived the Company of its role in the Indian 
Government. 2 
The Indian sub-continent under the British rule differed greatly 
from the India of Akbar3 or Aurungzeb. 4 Not only had the former unify-
8 
ing authority collapsed but the successors had in turn split the country 
into a number of rival factions. 
The British dominions in India were now more extens-
ive than Akbar's in 1600, for if his empire reached to 
Kandhar, Kabul, and Badakhsham it had stopped short at 
the Narbada. All India to the Sutly and Rayput deserts 
was now under British control; •••• 5 
V. P. Menon, Secretary of the State Department, Government of India, in 
his book, ~ Integration ~~Indian States, considers the British 
unification of the sub-continent as an unprecedented act in the history 
of India. He said that "no greater achievement can be credited to the 
British than that they brought India's enduring political consolidation. 116 
The British divided the Indian sub-continent into two kinds of 
political units; the Provinces or British India, and the Indian States 
or Princely India. British India, which was governed directly by the 
British through the Governor-General of British India,.was divided into 
2The Company itself was formally dissolved on.January l, 1874 by 
Act of Parliament. · 
3The greatest and most enlightened of the Moguls, he subdued the 
whole sub-continent except for the extreme south and ruled it from 1556-
1605 A.D. 
4 ~~-
The last of the great Moguls (1658-1707.A.D~). ,His,deathwas 
followed by the disintegration of the Empire. 
p. 3. 
5vincent A. Smith, The Oxford History .2f._ India (London, 1958), 
p. 578. 
6 V. P. Menon,~ Integration~~ Indian States (New York, 1956), 
9 
eleven Governors' Provinces (Bombay, Madras, Bengal, United Provinces, 
Punjab, Central Provinces, Bihar, Orissa, Assam, Sind, and North-west 
Frontier Provinces), and some centrally administered areas like Delhi, 
Ajmer, and Baluchistan. 
Princely India7 with its some five hundred and sixty-five states 
was governed ind.irectly through treaties which established Great Britain 
as the Paramount Power and deprived the states of full sovereignty. 
These states were under hereditary rulers who were bound to Great Brit-
ain by a treaty or some other form of agreement and owed allegiance to 
the Crown. The Government of India Act, 1935 1 defined an 'Indian State' 
as including 
any territory, whether described as a state, an Estate, a 
Jigar or otherwise, belonging to or under the Suzerainty 
of a ruler who is under the suzerainty of His Majesty and 
not being a part of British India. 8 
On their part, the Princes acknowledged the Paramount Power of the 
British over India; "in return they were guaranteed internal autonomy 
and full protection against insurrection."9 In the year 1858, Queen 
Victoria, in a proclamation, assured that the Crown "shall respect the 
rights, dignity and honour of native Princes11 • 10 The Paramount Power 
reserved to itself control over such central questions as defense, com-
munications, and foreign policy. "The States h?l,d no international life ••• 
7comprised roughly a third of pre-partition India's territory and 
a quarter of the pupulation. 
8Government of India, White Paper ~ Indian States (New Delhi, 
1950), p. 17. 
9Alice Thorner, "The Issues In Kashmir," Far Eastern Survey, XVII 
(1948), p. 174. 
lOWhite Paper On Indian States,~· .s£.!•, p. 12. 
the Paramount Power had the exclusive authority of making peace or war 
or negotiating or-communicating with foreign states. 1111 While the 
10 
sovereignty of the states had passed to the British, no British or Brit-
ish Indian authority could make laws for ·any of the states. The terri-
tories of the states had not become British territory, nor were their 
inhabitants British subjects. 
This political division of the sub-continent was to have its rami-
fications during the· period that preceded Independence Day, and later 
cast its long shadow on'the Kashmir.dispute. How this happened will be 
discussed .later in this chapter; however, before I go into that, it is 
necessary at this stage of my thesis to deal with the Muslims in India 
and the part they played in the country's partitition. They represented 
basic ideological differences which, from the start, clouded the Kashmir 
dispute, and hardened the positions of the two parties. 
It is true to say that the people who now inhabit India and Pakis-
tan have lived together on the sub-continent for the past twelve centu-
ries; however, this was not the result of mutual consent nor the product 
of a shared heritage. On the contrary, the Hindus·and'.the Muslims have 
different traditions and historical backgrounds. Mohammed Ali Jinnah12 
was referring to this when he said that "Hinduism and Islam ••• were more 
than two different religions; rather they were two different civiliza-
tions •••• 1113 Both have their independent histories of which they are 
11Ibid., p. 22. 
12The great leader of the All-India Muslim League Party in India 
who later became the founder of ·Pakistan. He will be referred· to in 
this thesis as Jinnah, 
13Phillips Talbot, "Kashmir and HydeI'abad·," World Politics, I 
(1949), p. 130. 
11 
proud, and each people has its own heroes who are honoured. 
The Muslims came to India as invaders in the first decade of the 
eighth century and their formal rule lasted till 1857, when the Muslims 
joined the Hindus and the Sikhs in common subjection to British rule. 
The Hindus never accepted Muslim rule as Indian rule, and the Hindus 
under Muslim rule never enjoyed the status of equal citizens. The prin-
ciples of Islamic jurisprudence Sharia\ ga;ve· ·them· only the. status ·of a 
subject nation, that of Zhimmis. In fact, the Jizia tax imposed on non-
Muslim subjects symbolized the inferior. status of the Hindus. This Mus-
lim attitude provoked a Hindu nationalist spirit, which on several oc-
casions came to the surface in the form of revolts against Muslim rule. 
The Muslim ruling class did not fully comprehend the far-reaching 
impact of resurgent Hindu nationalism, so by 1832 the Hindus were in oc-
cupation of Delhi, while the Sikhs had by 1800 established their rule in 
the Punjab. From then on the Muslim's role in India became a secondary 
role. 
The British did not originate the Hindu-Muslim conflict. The di-
viding lines between the Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims in India were al-
ready in existence when the British came on the scene. Jinnah referring 
to this said that India "was also a case of we divide and you rule".14 
To Nehru, on the other hand, "it was the British who were responsible 
for all the difficulties between these tw~ people, playing one against 
the other throughout the history of their occupation" .15 The same view · 
was held by Mahatma Gandhi, Father of the Nation, when he said that "it 
14P. Kodanda Rao, "Communalism in India·," Current History, XXX 
(1956), p. 84. 
15Joseph Korbel, Danger .!!!..Kashmir (Princeton, 1954), p. 41. 
12 
was the British statesmen who are responsible for the division in India's 
ranks and the divisions will continue so long the British sword holds 
. 16 
India under bondage." Hindu leaders were specifically critical of the 
system of separate electorates and the weighted representation of minor!-
ties which was imposed by the British in their constitutional reforms of 
Br.itish India. Those British enacted constitutional reforms 
••• enfranchised the citizens not as Indian nationals, but 
as a member of a community. Each community, which secured 
recognition ••• had a separate electoral role; it had its quota 
of representation fixed in advance; it could be represented 
only by its own members.17 
The British had their own explanation: " ••• the undeniable facts of 
the case, the social milieu of India, the cleavages between Hindus and 
Muslims, ••• made a national democratic approach impossible •••• 1118 
The truth of the matter is that the separate electorates were the 
legal acknowledgement of the existence of the Muslim community and the 
Hindu-Muslim conflict, which started with the arrival of the Muslims on 
the sub-continent, was never forgotten by either side. For.while the 
Muslims could go back to memories of ten centuries of Muslim rule in 
India and the heroes connected with this rule, the Hindus could not for-
get this period either. 
Was the consolidation of the Hindus and Muslims into one state at 
any time possible in the light of the preceeding twelve hundred years of 
history? The Muslims have said no, but Hindu·political leaders, in~ 
eluding Nehru and Gandhi, believed that the "melting pot" of India had 
16v. P. Menon, The Transfer of Power In India (Princeton, 1957), 
p. 108. 
17 Ko~anda, Rap, ~· =.!.'tot p. 79. 
18Ibid., pp. 82-83. 
13 
"Indianized" the Muslins just as the pre-Muslim invaders of India, i.e., 
Persians, Greeks, and White Huns had been assimilated into the Hindu 
social structure. The Hindu leaders believed that Muslims had lost the 
cultural distinctiveness which might have at one time entitled them to 
I 
be a separate nation. Muslim p9litical leaders have admitted that· 
throughout Indian history all foreign-race invaders eventually disappear-
ed as a separate entity, but quickly pointed out that the Muslims remain-
ed an exception to this r.ule. In this they are joined by such disinter-
ested scholars, as Mr. K. P. Karunakaran, a research associate in the 
Indian Council of World Affairs, wh.en he argued that 
India has been invaded by many races, including Greeks, the 
Sakas, and the Huns, they all merged with the original.in-
habitants of the country •••• But this did not happen in the 
case of Muslims. They brought with them definite social and 
religious institutions 1 which were in sharp contrast with 
those of the Hindus.19 
With the passage of time and particularly during the decade pre-
ceding independenc.e, this communal conflict reached its climax "marked 
by a growing animosity between the two political movements - the All-
Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League 11 • 20 By the end 
of March 1940, at the Lahore Annual Conference of the Muslim League, 
Jinnah said that 
Islam and Hinduism are not religions in the strict sense of 
the word, but are in fact different and distinct social 
orders, and it is only a dream that the Hindus and the Mus-
lims can ever evolve a common nationality.21 
19K. P. Karunakaran, "India In World Affairs," Indian Council of 
World Affairs (London, 1952), p. 113. 
20Korbel, 21?..• ill_. , p. 28 • 
21Menon, !!!!;_ Transfer 2!_ Power .!!!_ India, 2· ~·, p •. 82 • 
. .-·-::'":."".· 
In view of this, the Conference resolved that 
••• geographically contiguous ••• regions in which the Muslims 
are numerically in a majority ••• should be grouped to consti-
tute 'Independent States', in which the constituent units 
should be autonomous and sovereign. 22 
14 
This came to be known as the "Pakistan Resolution", the first for-
mal, overt demand made by the Muslim League to partition the sub-contin-
ent into two major, independent states that would separate the contigu-
ous Muslim ... majority areas (Pakistan) from Hindu-majority areas (India). 
The Muslim League committed itself to the ''two-nation" theory of 
Jinnah to the point of no return. On February 1941, the Working Com-
mittee of the Muslim League met and passed a resolution reaffirming the 
principles laid down in the Lahore Resolution of 1940. 
The Congress leaders finally conceded to this demand. On June 14, 
1947, the All-India Congress Committee met in Delhi and passed a resolu-
tion accepting partition. The resolution nevertheless has this to say 
about the unity of India: 
Geography .and the mountains and the seas fashioned India as 
she is, and no human agency can change that shape •••• Economic 
circumstances and the insistent demands of international af-
fairs make the unity of India still more necessary. The 
picture of India we have learnt to cherish will remain in 
our minds and our hearts. The A.I.c.c. earnestly trusts that 
••• India's problems will be viewed in their proper perspec-
tive and the false doctrine of two nations in India will be 
discredited and discarded by a11. 23 
On July 18, 1947, the Indian Independence Act as passed by the 
British Parliament stated that on August 15, His Majesty's Government 
would relinquish power to two independent countries; India and Pakistan. 
The division was to take place according to communal lines; the Hindu-
22Ibid., p. 83. 
23rbid., p. 384. 
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majority Provinces were to form the Union of India, and the Muslim-
majority Provinces were to form Pakistan. 
The Kashmir conflict is more than one aspect of the ideological 
clash of the two parties at the time of partition or a mere extention of 
it. To the Muslim League, the partition was an "inevitable" development 
based upon the "two-nation" theory of Jinnah. It had toi come because 
the Indian sub-continent is inhabited by two peoples with two major cul-
tures and two different ways of life. In contrast, the Congress' atti-
tude toward pa:rtition was that it is.a political concession on the part. 
of Indian leaders to avoid future communal troubles which had for so 
long bedevilled Indian politics but lldid not imply the acceptance of the 
validity of the two-nation theory nor the belief that partition was the 
right solution".24 India does not seem to have at any time changed this 
attitude. During the disturbances that proceeded partition, Nehru, 
India's Prime Ministe:r, reaffirmed India's faith in a secular state, for 
on October 12, 1947, he said: 
So far as India is concerned we have very clearly stated ••• 
that we can not think of any state which might be called a 
communal o:r religious state • .We can only think of a secular, 
non-communal democratic state in which every individual ••• 
has equal rights and opportunities,25 
These two opposing attitudes toward partition seem to have been 
carried over to the Kashmir problem: India trying to prove that Kash-
miris, though predominantly Muslim, can live with Indians in peace in a 
"secular" state, while Pakistanis see it as the repudiation of the whole 
"two-nation" theory, and in effect, the whole existence of Pakistan and 
24Keith B. Callard, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: ~ Interpretation 
(New York, 1957), p. 6. 
25Karunakaran, "India In World Affairsi'' ~~ ~., p~ 120. 
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and the essence of the State of Pakistan. 
Typical. of India's attitude is a statement made by Nehru in 1949 at 
a press conferrence following his return from a visit to the United States. 
Referring to American's lack of Uilderstanding of the Kashmir problem, 
Nehru said: 
One ••• misunderstanding, not only in the u.s. but also in 
other parts of the world was that the partition of India 
was viewed as if the Moslems and non-Moslems of India had 
been completely separated on a religious basis, that is to 
say, as an outcome of the old Moslem League's or Jinnah's 
theory of two-nations. So far as we are concerned~ we never 
accepted that theory; we repu<liated it throughout. 6 · 
In contrast, Pakistan, loyal to its "two-nation" theory, kept point-
ing out the predominantly Muslim population of Kashmir, and insisting 
that as such it had to be part of Pakistan. "For Pakistan anything less 
than such an admission casts doubts upon the legitimacy and permanence 
of the national homeland. 11 27 Pakistan is convinced that India's action 
was a clear attempt to destroy the integrity of Pakistan, and the depar-
tition of the sub-continent, and that India was seeking to extend its 
boundaries in utter disregard of the principles of partition as conceiv-
ed by Pakistan. "For Pakistan the very act of partitioning the sub-con-
tinent represented a~ jure recognition of the validity of Mr. Jinnah's 
two-nation theory."28 Liaquat Ali Khan, one time Prime Minister of Pak-
istan, repeatedly "asserted that Pakistan was surrounded by forces which 
were out ·to .destroy ,her;: ,and. J inhah, more than once speke of her as the 
26Michael Brecher, ~ Struggle ~ Kashmir (New York, .1953), pp. 
52-53. Quoted in: Indiagpam (daily bulletin of the Indian High Commis-
sion to the United Kingdom), Number 17, 1949. 
27 Callard, ~. .s.!!.. , p • 6 • 
· 
28Brecher, !?a• cit., p. 51. 
17 
victim of a deep-laid, well-planned conspiracy."29 
With this in mind, the Pakistan Government told the Security Coun-
in 1948 not to limit itself to the Kashmir question, but also to discuss 
all the different issues between India and Pakistan in order to show 
that Pakistan was facing a serious threat amounting to possible extinc-
tion. 
The Kashmir dispute is not only the result of ideological, religi- .. 
ous and cultural conflicts between India and Pakistan, it is also the 
product of the British system of government in India--British India and 
the Princely States. India and Pakistan are the successors of British 
India but Kashmir. is one of the Princely States, 
While Britian ruled India the status of Princely India posed no 
problem because Paramountcy provided the necessary elastic relationship 
between the British authorities and the Rulers of the States, With the 
advent of independence, the status of Princely India, raised the most 
crucial problem Indian politicians were to grapple with. "The.effect of 
partition on the constitutional status of Princely India was near-dis-
astrous uncertainty.n30 
British spokesmen had as early as May 12, 1946, declared, in the 
Cabinet Mission3l Memorandum on States Treaties and Paramountcy, that: 
••• His Majesty's Government will cease to exercise the powers 
of paramountcy. This means that the rights of the states 
which flow from their relationship to the Crown will no longer 
exist and that all the rights surrendered by the States to the 
Paramount Power will return to the states •••• The void will 
29E. w. R •. Lumby, The Transfer of Power In India (New York, 1954), 
-----P• 196. 
30 Brecher, 21?.• .£!!.•, p, 18. 
31was ordered in 1946 to plan the transfer of power in India. 
have to be filled either by the states entering into a federal 
relationship with the successor Government or Governments, or 
fa.i,ling this, entering into particular political arrangements 
with them. 32 
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The same theme .:was reiterated in the Indian Independence Act of July 18 • 
1947. It declared that: 
The suzeranity of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, 
and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the 
date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the 
Rulers of Indian States, •••• 33 
These statements make it appear that the British had no intention 
of handing over to a third party their contractual relationships with 
the Rulers of the States without their consent, They made it clear that 
Paramountcy over the states would just lapse with the transfer of power. 
"They would simply drop it. Whether the gravitation of power would en-
able anyone else to pick it up was another matter."34 
From a strictly legal point of view these statements made by the 
British authorities granted full freedom of action to the Princely 
States to accede to either Dominion or,· if they so wished, to remain in-
dependent entities. Lord Mountbatten,35 addressing the Chamber of 
Princes36 on the 25th of July 1947, said that "now, •••• The states have 
complete freedom; technically and legally they are independent. 1137 
32White Paper 2E. Indian States, £E.,• £!!•, p. 153. 
33Ibid., p. 156. 
34tumby, .21?.• ~· , p. 219. 
35The last Governor-General of British India; served from March 22 
to August 14, 1947. First Governor-General of the Dominion of India 
(Au~ust 15, 1947 to June 21, 1948). ·. 
36A del_iberative, consultative and advisory body which was brough~ 
into bei~_by Royal Proclamation of February 8, 1921. 
' . I 
37WhitePaper ~Indian States, EE_· cit., P• 161. 
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The independent status which the British granted to the PI>incely 
States led leading Congressmen to accuse the British of the "Balkaniza-
tion" of the Indian sub-continent. The .All-India Congress Committee met 
on 14 June 1947 11 and passed a resolution "declaring that the Congress 
did not agree with the theory of paramountcy as enunciated and interpret-
ed by the British Government. 1138 In effect,.the Congressmen argued that 
Paramountcy should revert·to the successor authorities in British India 
in order to avoid the "Balkanization" of the country. In the Congress 
press, the treaty rights were dismissed as "fictitious" or "imaginary11 1 39 
for they claimed it was the people rather than the Rulers who were to be 
consulted as to the futu:re of the States. 
Indian legal advisers developed a different legal theory. They 
claimed that: 
(l) None of the states had sovereign rights in the full 
sense of the term; nor did they have individually the 
necessary resources to claim or enjoy the attributes of 
a sovereign independent power. 
(2) The paramountcy relationship between_ the Crown and 
the states was essentially an extra-constitutional rela-
tionsh,!p; it is_a political relationship.40 
(3) /Therefore/ the real basis of Paramountcy was not 
treaties, pledges or promises, but the fact of British 
supremacy throughout India.41 
To those jurists, the lapse of Paramountc..y did not mean an end of all 
the arrangements with the British that existed within the realm of prac-
tical politics. "The essential defense and security requirements of the 
country and the compulsions of geography did not cease to be operative 
38Menon 1 !!!!:, Integration ~ Power ~ India, .2E.• £.!!.•, pp. 90-9L . 
3 9Lumby, 2£.. ill.· 1 p ~ 21. 9. 
40whi te Paper ~ Indian . States, 21!.• £.!!.• , pp. 144-,,145. 
41Lumby, 2£.• =.!!.• , p. 217 • 
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with the end of British rule in India. 114 2 In actuality, " ••• all the 
factors which established the paramountcy of the British Government over 
the states operated to assign a similar position to the Government of 
India.1143 
The Muslim League leaders held a completely different attitude. 
They approved the British interpretation of Paramountcy and its effects 
on the constitutional status of the Princely States. They even held the 
view that the states were fully entitled to join neither Dominion and if 
they so decided could become independent, sovereign states. In support 
of this Jinnah said that "the Cabinet Mission had never laid down that 
every state was bound to come into one or the other Constituent Assem.-
bly.1144 
These two conflicting attitudes toward Paramountcy and its effect 
on the constitutional status of Princely India were to have their rami-
fications on the Kashmir dispute. India kept reiterating her original 
attitude in an attempt to give legitimacy to her action in sending troops 
to Kashmir, for to Indian leaders it was within India's legal rights, 
being the successor of British India, to protect and defend Kashmir, 
which had asked for help against outside invaders. Taraknath Das, in 
an article in the Political Science Quarterly, put it this way: 
The Government of India, under the then existing treaties 
between Kashmir and the British Government of India, was 
obliged - as the legal heir of the British Government -
to defend Kashmir against any invasion •••• 
India, in order to meet its treaty obligations ••• , 
accepted the request for military aid and accession of 
42white Paper _2!!. Indian States, !:?.P..· ~., p. 143. 
43Ibid . 
44Menon, ~Integration~~ Indian States, .5:,• cit., p. 87. 
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Kashmir.45 
Pakistan, on the other hand, strongly rejected the Indian claim, 
and stood firm on its attitude toward Paramountcy a_nd its effects on the 
legal status of Princely India. Pakistani leaders maintained that India 
had no right to send troops to Kas~ir against the will of the majority 
of the l<ashmiri people and as such the-'Indian army in Kashmir was an 
) 
"occupation army". 
Do the principles of international law on states succession, as in-
terpreted by the United Nations Secretariat, help us to clarify this 
crucial issue between India and Pakistan?' The India~ Independence Act 
of J~ly 18, 1947, did pI'es.ent the SecretaI'iat of the United Nations with 
the problem of the membership of "India" in the Organization. Secretary-
GeneI'al Trygve Lie had to decide whether the partition had bJ:>ought into 
being two new states; India and Pakistan, and ask both to apply for-mem-
bership or tI'eat one of the two as the successoI' state and ask the otheI' 
to apply. On August 8, 1947,. Dr. Ivan l<erno, the Assistant Secretary-
General for Legal Affairs of the United Nations, gave the following legal 
opinion: 
From the viewpoint of International Law, the situa-
tion is one in which part of an existing state breaks off 
and becomes a new state. On this analysis there is no 
change in the international status of India; it continues 
as a State with all treaty rights and obligations. The 
territory which breaks off - Pakistan - will be a new 
state. It will not have the treaty rights and obligations 
of the old state and will not of course have membership in 
the United Nations. In International Law the situation 
is analogous to the separation of the Irish Free State 
from Britain, and of Belgium from the Netherlands. In 
these cases the portion which separated was considered a 
new state, and the remaining portion continued as an 
45Taraknath Das, "The Kashmir Issue and The United Nations," 
Political Science Quarterly, LXV (1950) 1 p. 268. 
existing state with all the rights and duties it had 
befo;r:,e. 46. 
Pizada,· the rep;r:,esentative of Pakistan in the General Assembly, 
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"pointed to the division as being a disintegration rather than a seces-
sion11,47 and, in effect, did not accept the legal opinion that the per-
sonality of British India had been sustained in the new India. Arce, 
the representative of Argentina, supported the Pakistani representative 
in critizing the opinion of the Secretariat, and held that "the two new 
states should receive identical treatment, and they should either become 
Members of the U.N. automatically or both have to ask for admisstion. 1148 
The opinion of the Secretariat was also criticized by D. P. O'Con-
nell as presenting an improper interpretation of the Irish Free State 
and Belgium cases, as in these two cases • 
••• the old sovereign actively participated in the act which 
created the new states. The creation of Pakistan, ••• was 
not the act of India, nor did India directly participate 
in it. It was a division enacted by a constitutional su-
perior, and /Tn7 no sense of the word, •• could it be consid-
ered that there was any secession on the part of Pakistan. 
Both Dominions were in the position of new states.49 
However, the Security Council and the General Assembly accepted the 
Secretary-General's ruling and put Pakistan alone through the prescribed 
formalities of membership. Whatever the merits of each opinion may have 
been, the partition of British India presented a controversial case 
46United Nations, Department of Public Information, Press Release 
(PM/473, August 12, 1947), p. 42. 
47united Nations, General Assembly, Sixth Committee, Summary Re-
cords, 43rd Meeting (October 7, 1947), p. 42. 
48Ibid., 42nd Meeting (October 6, 1947).p. 38. 
49n. P. O'Connell, The Law of State Succession (Cambridge, 1956). 
----.. - ....... ---------P• 6 • 
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which, while it started as a problem of membership, was later projected 
into the Kashmir case with India claiming itself the successor of Brit-
ain vis-a-vis the Princely States, and Pakistan strongly contesting this. 
CHAPTER III 
THE IMPORTANCE OF KASHMIR TO BOTH INDIA'S 
AND PAKISTAN'S NATIONAL INTERESTS 
In the previous Chapter I discussed the attitudes of the Pakistani 
Muslim League and the Indian National Congress on the question of parti-
tion and the doctrine of freedom of,action of ·the Princely States, and 
pointed out how Jinnah of t~e Muslim League accep~ed the full i~plica-
tions of this doctrine as inter~reted by the British, while the Congress 
Party first rejected the basis of the doctrine and then reluctantly ac-
cepted it.1 
When the Kashmir problem came to the fore,.the Muslim League which 
had acknowledged the right of the rulers of the Princely States to full· 
freedom of decision, considered the issues in Kashmir so vital to Pakis-
tan that it refused to concede to the Maharajah (Ruler of the State) the 
right to determine Kashmir's future according. to his own.free will. 
India, on the other hand, clothed its interests with a mantle of legali-
ty by first accepting the accession of the State and then proceeding to. 
send troops to help stop ~he invasion. India acted in this way because 
it considered it has vital interests in Kashmir's fate. 
To understand and appreciate the magnitude of the issues involved 
and the consequences of the conflicting attitudes of India and Pakistan, 
1ror a fuller explanation see Brecher, 2a• .£!.!.•, pp. 18-22. 
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a study of the national interests of the two parties, how they have af-
fected their Kashmir polities, and the real motives of the two parties 
is necessary. I will discuss both the economic and the strategic con-
sideratio~s, which are so inextricably interrelated. The ideological 
considerations have already been dealt with in the previ9us chapter. -
The economic factors stand so pronounced. There is no doubt that 
partition had a disruptive effect on the economies of both India and 
Pakistan. Under British rule, and during the sixty years preceding par-
tition, the British authorities developed a.scheme for the irrigation of 
the Indus basin, 2 "which would irrigate lands belonging to the Crown, so 
that the Government of ~ritis~ India could earn revenues not only from 
the water rates, but also froin the sale of Crown lands. 113 The plan as 
prepared by British engineers did not take into consideration the politi-
cal delimitations which had no existence at that time. 
With the partition of the Punjab Province along communal and not .. 
economic lines, a massive agricultural problem came into being. Pakis-
tan was left with the major part of the irrigated lands of the Punjab-
and Sind, while the upper reaches of the rivers supplying much of the 
water was left within India or Kashmir. This situation was well illus-
trated by a leading Indian newspaper, ~ Statesman, which said: 
Partition has placed West Pakistan, and especially 
Punjab /Pakistani section/ and the Bahwalpur State, in a 
vulnerable position as three of the rivers of the Indus 
basin flow through Punjab Lindian section/ into Punjab 
2The Indus system of rivers consists of the main river Indus, five 
tributaries from the east, the Jhelum,· Chenab, Ravi, Sutly and the Beas, 
and a few tributaries from the west, the most impoz,tant of which is the 
river of Kabul. 
3L. Rushbrook Will.iams, "The Indus Canals Waters Problem·/' Asian 
Review, LI (April., 1955), p. 140. 
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LPakistani section/.4 
The Pakistani leaders were aware of this delicate economic situation 
for on April 1, 1948, the Indian East Punjab Government cut off the wa-
ter flowing into the canals in Pakistan and Pakistan immediately felt 
the consequences, Pakistan so vividly learned that the State of Kashmir 
with its water resources is the life-line of its agricultural economy. 
So long as "two thirds of the entire water supply originates in Kashmir, 
where the snow-fed Indus rises, 115 Pakistan can not let the State be con-
trolled by a hostile power. 
The leaders of Pakistan have made frequent references to Kashmir's 
economic importance to show how vital Kashmir is for the existence and .. 
welfare of Pakistan. One time Pakistan Foreign Minister, Zafrullah Khan, 
on February 8 1 1950, stressed the importance of these economic factors 
while arguing his country's case before the Security Council, He re- . 
ferred to the volume of trade between Kashmir and Pakistan to prove·. the 
commercial interdependence o~ the State.of Kashmir and Pakistan. As to 
the real economic factor - the canal waters - he had this to say: 
The three rivers - beginning at the top of the map, the Indus, 
the Jehelum and the Chenab - which flow from Kashmir into Pak-
istan, control a very large extent the agrlcultural economy of 
Pakistan itself. :The economy of the whole of West Pakistan 
is based almost entirely upon its irrigationsystem, that is 
to say, upon the application of scientific methods to make the 
waters of these rivers available for purposes of agriculture 
through irrigation woI'ks and iI'rigation channels. As much as 
19 million acres of land is irrigated in West Pakistan from 
the waters of these rivers •••• 
If Kashmir were to accede to India, this supply would be 
cut off altogether. This is not an idle apprehension on the 
part of West Pakistan. 
4The Statesman (Calcutta), March 28, 1950, p. l. 
- . 
5David E. Lilienthal, ~'Another 'Korea' In The Making?n Colliers 
(New York), August 4, .1951, p. 58, 
He then referred to India's action in cutting off the water supply to 
West Pakistan in April 1948 and declared that: 
Assume for one moment, that Kashmir were to accede to India. 
The same would apply to the other three rivers, ••• which flow 
from Kashmir into Pakistan, would also be denied to Pakistan, 
•••• Nineteen million acres would be turned into a waste, and 
millions of people would be faced with starvation and extinc-
tion. That is an economic factor the like of which can not 
be produced in a comparable case anywhere else. 6 
Liaquat Al.i Khan, who was Prime Minister of Pakistan at that time, 
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stressed the same points. In an.interview with David E. Lilienthal, he 
said: 
Kashmir is very important, is vital 
it is what you might call a luxury~ with 
sity of our survival •••• If I allow .India 
then I am always at the mercy of India. 
of millions will have been in vain, 7 
to Pakistan; to India 
us it is a vital neces-
to have ••• /Kashmir7, 
Then the sacrifices 
Using the same logic Pakistani leaders pointed out the strategic 
importance of Kashmir to the security of Pakistan. Zafrullah Khan asked. 
the Security Council to pay attention to these strategic factors. To 
him 
••• India's security would not be affected one ounce by the ac-
cession of Kashmir to Pakistan. There is nothing that would 
be placed in jeopardy if that should happen. The barrier be-
tween Kashmir and India, except for those twenty miles, is 
all mqµntainous, and ••• would make no difference to the secur-
ity of India, to its strategy or to its defense arrangements 
O O I I 
O.n the other hand, look at the question from the point of 
view of Pakistan •••• /the two main strategic road and railway. 
systems of West Pakistan running parallel throughout l<ashmir7. 
The whole of the defense of that area, ••• is based upon the -
fact that this line would not be threatened from the flank. If 
Kashmir acceded to India, the whole of that flank would be 
threatened and broken ••• India would obtain direct access to 
the tribal and, through the tribal areas, on to Afghanistan. 
Pakistan's position would become absolutely untenable •••• 
6(S/PV 464, February a, 1950), pp. 5-6. 
7Lilienthal, ~· =.!!.•, pp. 56-57. 
Again from the point of view of defense, quite as many 
as 10,000 Pakistani soldiers are drawn from certain areas 
of the Kashmir State, mainly Poonch •••• 8 
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A similar theme, the strategic value of Kashmir to the security of Pak-
istan, was echoed by Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951. During the above mention-
ed interview with Lilienthal, he stated that: 
The very position - the strategic position of Kashmir -
is such that without it Pakistan can not defend herself 
against an unscrupulous government that might come to India 
•••• 
We might as well fight in Kashmir - , that. isqny conclu-
sion. Otherwise the next time it will be east Bengal and 
""'so on to the dissolution of Pakistan.9 
General Sir Frank Messervy, in an article in the Asian Review, commented 
on the st?'ategic importance of Kashm1r to Pakistan by saying: 
Pakistan is only interested in Kashmir defensively, ••• 
she can not possibly allow any hostile or potentially hos-
tile countI'y to hold .Kashmir. An enemy force in Kashmir 
would thI'eaten at close range the main vital rail and road 
communications from· Lahore to Peshawar.lo 
Working from these two considerations, the economic and the strate-
gic, the Pakistani leaders came to the general conclusion~ which they 
have never tired of repeating, that Kashmir must belong to Pakistan for 
ethnological, economic, and strategic reasons.· Liaquat Ali Khan, speak-
ing at a luncheon given in his honour by the Commonwealth Club of Cali-
fornia in San Francisco during his 1950 visit to the United States, said 
that "geographically, economically, strategically and culturally Kashmir 
~· ~ 
was an integral part of Kaistan.nll 
8(S/PV 464), pp. 6-8. 
9Lilienthal, 2£.• ~. , p. 56-57. 
lOGeneral Sir Frank Messervy, "Kashmir·," Asian Review, XLV (January, 
1949), p. 475. 
llThe Statesman, May 18, 1950, p. 5. 
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Although it is difficult to determine the extent to w~ich any of 
these factors have influenced Pakistan's policies toward Kashmir, the 
29 
fact remains that these considerations put together had a great deal of 
influence on the shaping of Pakistan's attitudes. Richard Symonds seems 
to have acknowledged this when he wrote: "so vital !TiJ its possession 
for economic and political security to Pakistan that her whole foreign 
and defense policy has largely revolved round the Kashmir df.spute. 1112 
The Indian leaders were also aware of the economic and the strate-· 
gic value of Kashmir to India's national power. Indian spokesmen have 
on the whole refrained from placing great stress on the economic aspects 
of the Kashmir dispute. Yet at least on one occasion they mentioned its 
economic importance within the context of India's geographical position 
as a Central Asian State. Thus during the initial presentation of the 
Indian case before the Security Councilt Gopalswami Ayyangar, the repre-
sentative of. India, said that "economically alsot Kashmir is intimately 
associated with India. The caravan trade routes from Central Asia to 
India pass through Kashmir State. 1113 
Whatever the reasqns behind this soft peddling of the economic 
factor by India may be, it still operates in shaping India's policies .. 
toward Kashmir, and, in effect, making the possession of Kashmir a vital 
necessity for the national economy of India. "From the economic point 
of view Kashmir ranked thiI'd among the Indian Stat"es in weal th. Its ••• 
great reserves of unexploited mineral deposits added to its value."14 
l2symonds, !?E.• .£!!_. , p. 87. 
13(S/PV 227, January 15, 1948), p. 13. 
14Thorner, "The Issues In Kashmir','' 2£.• £!!_., p. 173. 
Though it is the least developed of the regions in the sub-continent, 
there is evidence that 
Kashmir ••• c.ontains considerable forest and mineral re-
sources which are valuable to a sub-continent confronted 
with the necessity of greater industrialization. The extent 
of its mineral wealth was revealed by an exhaustive inquiry 
made in 1923 which indicated the existence of bauxite and 
coal in considerable quantity and of a rather high quality, 
as well as iron, copper, lead, zinc, etc.15 
Kashmir fits so nicely into India's industrial development plans 
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and would greatly add to the economic potential of the State for setting 
up industries on a large scale. India would undoubtedly benefit from 
the possession of Kashmir by exploiting its raw materials, 
As to the strategic location of Kashmir, Indian statesmen indicated 
an interest in the geographical position of Kashmir, and pointed out its 
tremendous strategic significance for the defense of the country. Evi-
dence of India's interest in Kashmir's strategic location can be found 
in Ayyamgar's initial presentation of the Indian case before the Secu~-
ity Coµncil. He sai.d: 
Kashmir because of its geogl'aphical position, with its 
frontiers contiguous with those of countries like the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China, is of 
vital importance to the security and international con-
tacts of India.16 
The same view was expressed as early as October 25, 1947, by Nehru in a 
cable sent to Attlee, the British Prime Minister. Nehru said: 
Kashmir northern frontiers, ••• run in common with 
three countries, Afghanistan, the u.s.s.R. and China. 
Security of Kashmir ••• is vital to security of India 
especially since part of southern boundary of Kashmir and 
India are common. Helping Kashmir,·therefore, is an 
15Brecher, 2£,• ill·, pp. 2-3. 
16(S/PV 227), p. 13. 
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obligation of national inter~st to India.17 
It requires little knowledge of political or military strategy to 
compre~end the geographical importance of this peculiar location of 
Kashmir to India's position as a Central Asian power. The Indian lead-
ers, aspiring to build a inajor "Central Asian Power" that would play a 
.powerful role among the Asian nations, "were by no means. reconciled to 
the prospect of Kashmir's inclusion in Pakistan. Since/ •• Kashmir was· 
conceived of as both a gateway to greater influence in Central Asia and 
a bastion of defense. 1118 
These considerations have undoubtedly shaped and determined the 
policies of India toward the Kashmir dispute. The Indian leaders, mot!.-
vated by factors_ impinging so closely on to their national interest, 
showed no willingness to accept any change in their expressed attitudes 
toward the different issues of the problem. 
It is clear that, in addition to the ideological considerations 
whi.ch I have dealt with in the preceding chapter, all of the considera-
tions discussed in this chapte~ have contributed to the rigidity of both 
parties toward the Kashmir dispute. Both parties stressed their ideolo-
gical concepts and did their best to defend the legitimacy of their na-
tional interests, and in so doing deadlocked the Kashmir problem. These 
were major considerations to both parties in their struggle for Kashmir; 
so much so, that neither felt able to yield any of its ideological be-
liefs or national interests, and no doubt the United Nations was fully-
17Government of India, White Paper Q!!_ Jammu ~ Kashmir (New Delhi, 
1948), pp. 45-46. 
18Alice Thorner, "The Kashmir Conflict," Middle ~ Journal, III 
(Jan~y, 1949), p. 18. 
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aware of this in its deliberations. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ACTUAL DISPUTE OVER KASHMIR 
Independence Day came on August 15, 1947 and brought with it the 
partition of British India and the question of whether the Princely 
States would accede to India or to Pakistan. Maharajah Hari Singh, 
Hindu ruler of Kashmir, decided not to accede to either Dominion. He 
disliked the idea of becoming a part of India, which was being democrat-
ized, or of Pakistan, which was Muslim. 
He knew that accession to India would eventually have meant 
the substitution of responsible government for his absolute 
autocracy ••• and ••• accession to Pakistan would probably have 
involved the loss of his throne.l · · 
Had the Maharajah acceded to either Dominion before August 15, 1947 
·the Kashmir dispute might not have risen. "The Maharajah's chronic in-
decision must be accounted a big factor in the present crisis. Almost 
any course of action taken quickly would have saved his State from this 
turmoil."2 Lord Mountbatten was concerned with this attitude of the Ma-
harajah. Here was a state with .an area of 84,471 square miles, about the 
size of Minne$ota,-·and a population of about four millions, of whom about 
75.-per:cent were Muslims, i;-uled over .by·•a, Hindu Maharajah.. To encourage 
'the Maharajah to· take a decision, Lord Mountbatten visited Kashmir 
1Brechei"' , 3?.. .£!!.. , p • 24 • 
2Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission With Mountbatten (New York, 1953), 
p. 223. 
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in July 1947, and spent foul" days convincing the Maharajah to "asce!"tain 
the will of ••• Lth~ people by any means and join whichever Dominion ••• 
/the7 people wish ••• /him7 to join by August 14 this year."3 The Mahar-
- - ~ -
ajah did not heed Mountbatten's advice and for some time seemed to think 
that he could remain independent. This was impl,icitly pointed out in 
his letter accompanying. the Instrument of Accession, dated 26 Octobe!" 
1947,4 but the realities of the situation, however, made such a statt.ts. 
absolutely impossible. 
With the passage of time, the Maharajah realized the necessity of 
coming to some kind of agreement with the successors of British India. 
Thus on August ll, 1947 he announced his willingness to enter into a 
Standstill Agreement with both India and Pakistan. The Government of 
P.akistan negotiated and signed such an agreement effective August 15 
"providing for the continuance of economic and administrative relations 
between the State and Pakistan on the same basis as before the creation 
of the Dominion."5 That is to say, the State authorized Pakistan to !'Un 
the postal and telegraphic arrangements of the State as they we!"e run by 
the Government of Bl'itish India, and in retul'n Pakistan was obliged to 
supply the State with food and other necessities. 
The Maharajah also approached the Government of India for a similar 
agreement, but India neither accepted nor rejected the offer. He was in-
formed that further discussion of the problem would be required before 
any action could be taken. Indeed the Indian officials did not seem to 
3Mountbatten of Burma, ~Only~~ Forward (London, 1949), 
p. 268. 
4see Appendix A. 
5Thorner, "The Kashmir Conflict,"~· cit., p. 19. 0 
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be after an action that would lead to another conflict with Pakistan. 
Whatever the reason behind the Indian attitude toward the Standstill 
Agreement may have been, the Pakistani officials interpreted the lack of 
a formal agreement with India to mean that Kashmir was part and parcel 
of Pakistan. Thus Zafrullah Khan told the Security Council on January 
16, 1948, that 
having regard to his geographical position and the distribution 
of population in his State, /the Maharajah7 knew that it was as 
much as his throne was worth-if he made any movement in the dir-
ection of accession to India, so long as his people were there 
to protect and to desire accession to Pakistan.6 
Soon a number of developments occured which were to lead to a rapid 
deterioration in the relations between the Maharajah's Government and 
Pakistan. During the weeks that followed the partition of the Punjab, 
Kashmir became the main passage for the movement of Muslim refugees to 
West Punj,ab (Pakistan) and the reverse movement of Hindus and Sikhs to 
East Punjab (India). Those X'efugees, "economically and socially uproot-
ed and full of bitterness", came into conflict with each otheJ:', and, in 
effect, "neighboJ:'hood clashes ensued, as well as smash-and-grab J:'aids .... 
- - 7 both by Muslims ••• and by Dogras and LHindu/ refugees •••• " 
Amidst this confusion, the Poonch revolt broke out by the end of" -
August against the authority of the Maharajah and the Raja (governor) of 
Poonch. But, essentially, it was "a widespread popular demand for re-
dress of grievances against the Poonch administration118 and "against 
6(S/PV 228, January 16, 1948), p. 67, 
7 Thorner, "The Kashmir Conflict," .5!.• cit. , p. 20. 
~ ... 
8Thorner, "The Issues In Kashmir," .5!.• cit • , p , 17 6 • 
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taxation."9 In reply, the State's troops who were mostly Hindus resort-
ed to harsh punitive measures in order to suppress the Poonch villagers 
who were predominantly Muslims, and "the conflict soon assumed a commun-
al character. 1110 The Poonchis who were ex-servicemen of the old army of 
India, with the help of a:r:m'!s and ammunitions from their comrades in Pak-
istan, fought bitterly against the State's troops. 
This tragic event was followed by charges and counter-charges be-
tween the Government of Pakistan and the Maharajah. Pakistan alleged 
that the Maharajah's soldiers were engaged in a terrible mass persecu-
tion of Muslims in Poonch, which Pakistan described as a ruthless policy 
of "extermination" of Muslims. In reply, the Government of Kashmir em-
phatically rejected the Pakistani Government's charges and claimed that 
armed raiders of Muslims from Pakistan had infiltrated the State and 
committed acts of horror on non-Muslims, 
Difficulties also developed over the economic supplies which the 
State of Kashmir was to have received under the Standstill Agreement,with 
Pakistan. Early in September 1947, several essential commodities, which 
Pakistan was required to provide the State with, were cut off. Conse-
quently, the Kashmir Government claimed that the Pakistani action was in 
effect an "economic blockade to Kashmir to coerce her into accession.'tll 
Pakistan denied the,Kashmir charges ~nd.blamed.special·circumstances 
beyond the control of Pakistan. Thus, in a cable sent in October·2, 
1947, Zafrullah Khan told the Prime Minister of Kashmir the following: 
9Loro Birdwood, "Kashmir," International Affairs, XXXVIII (1952), 
p. 302. 
10Thorner, "The Issues In Kashmir," 2E.• .s.!!_., p. 176. 
ll Korbel, 2• .:.!!•, p. 65. 
We are willing to see that Kashmir is supplied with 
essential commodities of which it is in need. It must how-
ever be appreciated that certain difficulties stand in our 
way. Drivers of lorries, for instance, are reluctant to 
carry supplies between Rawalpindi and Kohala.12 
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In the process of exchanging charges and counter-charges, the Prime Min-
ister of Kashmir ended his telegram of October 18 with the significant 
intimation that unless the Government of Pakistan put an end to these 
"inequities", the Government of Kashmir would have no choice but to ask 
for "friendly assistance". On October 20, 1947, in a sharp reply to 
this telegram, the Pakistani Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, warned 
him against accession to India without the declared will of his people 
who are predominantly Muslims. On the following day, October 21, 1947, 
the large-scale tribal invasion began. 
The tribesmen came from the North-west Frontier Province. "They 
were a restless people. Every man carried a rifle and recognized only 
one authority - his tribal chief. 111~ They followed the Muslim faith 
with a great degree of fanaticism. The holy Koran was the revealed law 
and to uphold and defend it was a sacred duty. Now that their Muslim 
brothers 1n Kashmir were in danger, it was their ultimate duty to cross 
the border to defend them against oppression. Certainly boundaries, in 
the sense of international law, were no obstacle to them. 
On October 21, 1947, some two thousand tribesmen crossed the State's 
borders; on October 22 they sacked the town of Muzaffarabad, and pro-
ceeded along the Jhelum Valley rbad .toward Srinagar, the summer Capital 
of Kashmir. On the fourth day the pro-Pakistani "Azad" (Free) Kashmir 
12ror the complete text of these charges and counter-charges see: 
White Paper 2!!, Jammu ~nd Kashmir, ~· cit., pp. 6-13. 
13Korbel, ~· .=!:!.•, p. 73. 
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Government was formed. Various interpretations have been given for the 
tribal invasion, and I will elaborate on this later in this chapter, but 
it is worth mentioning here that according to Symonds, the tribesmen 
"saw an opportunity of gaining both religious merit and rich booty •••• 1114 
Politically, however, the tribal invasion had the outstanding achievement 
of making up the Maharajah's mind to accede to India. Campbell-Johnson, 
an eye-witness of the actua.l events, wrote in his book, Mission With 
Mountbatten, that "it is probable that nothing short of a full-scale in-
vasion to the gates of his capital would have induced the hesitating 
Maharajah to accede at a11. 1115 
On the evening of 24 October the Government of India received a 
desperate appeal for help from the Maharajah. Lord Mountbatten urged 
Nehru and the other Indian Ministers that "it would be dangerous to send 
in any troops unless Kashmir had first offered to accede. 1116 Lord Mount-
batten explained to Campbell-Johnson his line of thinking on accession 
by saying that: 
He considered that it would be the height of folly to send 
troops into a neutral state, where we had no right to send 
them, since Pakistan could do exactly the same thing, which 
could only result in a clash of armed forces and in war.17 
On October 25 the accession offer was made by the Maharajah.18 At an 
emergency meeting of the Indian Defense Council on the 26th, it was de-
cided that accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be accepted 
14symonds, · ~· .£!.!.·, p. 158. 
15campbell-Johnson, 2E.• .£!!.•, p. 240. 
16Ibid., p. 225. 
17Ibid., p. 225. 
18see Appendix A. 
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immediately and that troops should be sent at once to rescue the State. 
The next day, October 27, Lord Mountbatten in a letter to the Maharajah, 
accepted the accession of the State,19 but made it provisional to the 
wishes of the people which were to be consulted in a plebiscite as soon 
as ''law and order" were restored. Legally and according to the proced-
ure prescribed in the Indian Independence Act, the Instrument of Acces~. 
sion made India free to send troops. India immediately dispatched troops 
to Srinagar by air, barely saving it from the tribesmen. They gradually 
cleared the Valley of Kashmir by pushing the tribesmen back. 
In.response to the Indian military action in Kashmir, Jinnah, Gover-
-
nor-General of Pakistan, ordered General Gracey, the British Acting Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, to dispatch troops to Kashmir. 
General Gracey thereupon sought approval of the British Supreme Cornman-
der, Field-Marshal Auohinleck. Campbell-Johnson tells us that Auchlin-
leek flew to Lahore and warned Jinnah that an act of invasion would lead 
to an immediate withdrawal of all British officers serving with the Pak-
istan ArmyQ Jinnah cancelled the order.20 
Pakistan refused to recognize the accession, and instead assisted 
the "Azad" Kashmir Government. which comp~ised the pro-Pakistan politi-· 
cal movement, the Muslim Conference of Jammu and Kashmir, which con-
trolled part of Kashmir. The other part of the state was under the con-
trol of the pro-India political movement, the National Conference of· 
Jammu and Kashmir, the leader of which Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, on 
October 31 became the Head of Emergency Administration. Later on he was 
19see Appendix B. 
20campbell-Johnson, 2E.• ~., p. 226. 
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to become the Pr>ime Minister of the Government of Kashmir. 
The tribal invasion and accession of Kashmir to India have been dur-
ing the past two decades the subject of unresolved controversy between 
India and Pakistan. Both parties have taken diametrically opposed stands 
on the causes of the tribal invasion and the accession offer. The Indian 
Government says that ever since the Maharajah of Kashmir decided not to 
accede to either Dominion, the Government of Pakistan kept trying to 
coerce him into accession to Pakistan. It accused Pakistan of inciting 
communal hatred among the Muslims and giving aid to raiders and terror-
ists in Kashmir. Nehru expressed this Indian position when in an address 
before the Indian National Assembly on November 25 he said that the raids 
. had been "carefully planned and well organized by the Pakistani author!-
ties with the deliberate object of seizing the State by force, and then 
declaring its accession to Pakistan. 1121 Pakistani denials were received 
by Indian officials with utmost skepticism, for 
To contend that the tribal invasion of Kashmir was wholly 
a spontaneous affair would be too huge a strain on human 
credulity. That it was a pre-planned and well-organized 
affair can today admit no doubt.22 
India has insisted that Pakistan was an aggressor state and that India 
sent its troops to Kashmir under the act of accession which made Kashmir 
a part of India. Taraknath Das put it this way: 
This act of aggression by Pakistan abrogated the Standstill 
Agreement •••• Futhermore, the Maharajah sent a formal re-
quest to India to allow Kashmir to accede to ••• India. This 
appeal ••• was supported by the National Conference •••• 23 
21Lumby, .2£.• =!!•, pp. 254-255. 
22Menon, !2.:, Integration ~~Indian States, .22• .£.ll., p. 414. 
23nas, .2£.• =!!•, p. 268. 
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Accordingly, to India the act of accession is legal, that Kashmir is now 
Indian territory and that it is up to India to decide when peaceful con-
ditions are created to consult the people. 
Pakistani officials have repeatedly denied the Indian contentions 
that Pakistan helped the raiders, and claimed that the tribal invasion 
was a spontaneous action on the part of the tribesmen to rescue their 
Muslim brothers in Kashmir from extinction at the hands of the Maharajah's 
troops. On December 30, 191+7, Liaquat Ali Khan, in a letter sent to 
Nehru, presented Pakistan's attitude toward the tribal invasion. He 
wrote: 
The sole responsibility for the distUI"bances in that State 
must squarely lie on the Maharajah and his Government, who ••• 
persisted in their policy of repression of Muslims. Repression 
was followed by resistance, particularly in the area of Poonch 
which is inhabited by a large number of ex-soldiers. The re-
sistance in its turn met .with more repression •••. • This state of 
affairs aroused strong feelings of sympathy throughout Pakistan, 
particularly among the Muslims living in the contiguous areas 
who had numerous ties of relationship with the persecuted 
people of the state. Some of these people went across to as-
sist their kinsmen in their struggle for freedom and indeed for 
existence itself. 
The letter went on to refute the Indian charges. It stated that: 
As regards the charges of aid and assistance to the "in-
vaders" by the Pakistan Government we emphatically repudiate 
them, On the contrary ••• the Pakistan Government have contin-
ued to do all in their power to discourage the tribal move-
ments by all means short of war.21+ 
The Pakistani officials saw in India's action in accepting the ac-
cession offer and in coming to the aid of the Maharaj~h an act of vio-
lence against the Muslim.majority of Kashmir. They detected a plot be-
tween the Maharajah, the Indian Government, and Sheikh Abdullah, who had 
24White Paper~ Jammu ~ Kashmir, .212.• .£!!., pp. 80-81. 
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been released from prison at the end of September 1947, against the 
people of Kashmir. As such, to them, the accession was not legal since 
it rested on violence and fraud, and would never be accepted by Pakistan. 
On November 4, 1947 1 Liaquat Ali Khan, in an address to the nation, had 
this to say: 
We do not recognize this accession. The accession of 
Kashmir to India is a fraud, perpetuated on the people of 
Kashmir by its cowardly Ruler with the aggressive help of 
the Indian Government. The release of Sheikh Abdullah who 
had been convicted of high treason and the continued impris-
onment of Muslim Conference leaders who had been convicted 
of mere technical offenses is only a part of the conspir-
acy •••• 2s 
In support of this conspiracy thesis, "the Pakistanis insist that the 
dispatch with which aid was sent to Srinagar only further indicates that 
such aid had been planned for weeks. 1126 Thus at a press conference in 
Karachi on January 3, 1948, the Pakistani Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali 
Khan, told the newsmen that "it is rather significant that the very day 
the Government of India signed the Instrument of Accession, Indian troops 
had landed in Srinagar, by 9 AM on October 21. 11 27 The Pakistani spokes-
men have insisted that the Indian claim that Kashmir is a part of India's 
territory is wholly wrong., untenable and utterly opposed to the princi-
ples of accession as reference should be made to the wishes of the people 
whenever there is a religious cleavage between the people and the Ruler. 
From these different interpretations of the legality of accession 
flow the sharply conflicting attitudes of the two parties on how the 
Kashmir dispute should be resolved. This was revealed in the course of 
25Brecher, ~· .£.!!.•, p. 33. 
26Korbel, 2£.• ~·, p. 85. 
27Brecher, ££,• =!!•, pp. 33-34. 
Quoted in: Dawn, Novembers, 1~7. 
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the United Nations Secu:rity Council discussions. Pakistan tried to con-
vince the Council that accession was illegal, and, in effect, India had 
no right to send troops to Kashmir, but since India had already sent 
troops, Pakistan wanted these troops withdrawn, a plebiscite held as soon 
as possible under the United Nations auspices to be conducted by an im-
partial administration in the State. India, on the other hand, ~ept re-
iterating the view that Kashmir was legally a part of India; and that 
Pakistan became an aggressor by helping the "invaders". Moreover, India 
maintained the view that the withdrawal of the "invaders" from the State 
was a precondition for a plebiscite which the administration in the 
State would conduct under the United Nations supervision. This is a pre-
condition which has not been fulfilled to the present day. 
Before I discuss the United Nationsentry as a third party in the· 
dispute, it is necessary to cover that period of diplomatic negotiations 
between the two disputants that proceeded the tribal invasion and acces-
sion because their failure was followed by United Nations intervention. 
On the very day the accession offer was accepted and Indian troops 
were dispatched to Srinagar, Jinnah, Governor-General of Pakistan, took 
the initiative and invited both Lord Mountbatten, Governor-General of 
India, and Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, to a conference with the 
Pakistani side in Lahore. Lord Mountbatten pressed strongly for the La-
hore meeting, flbut he understands at the Cabinet /meetini,I this after-
noon ••• that pressure on Nehru not to go was very heavy, and that on-
reaching his house he /Nebr~ practically collapsed •••• 1128 It was never-
theless agreed to send Lord Mountbatten alone to Lahore. 
28campbell-Johnson, ~· ~., p. 226. 
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The Jinnah-Mountbatten talks at Lahore, which opened on November l, 
1947 revealed the diametrically opposite stands of the two parties on the 
main issues of the dispute •. · Jinnah began by compla.ining that the Govern-
ment of India had not informed the Pakistani Government of its intentions 
to accept the accession and to send troops t? Kashmir. He reiterated the 
common Pakistani view that since the accession was based on "fraud and 
violence" it could not be recognized by the Pakistani Government. Lord 
Mountbatten replied by saying that the accession had indeed been brought 
about by violence, but the violence came from the tribes, for whomPak-
istant and not India, was responsible. Thus the discussion got into a 
vicious circle. 
Jinnah nevertheless came out with the first general proposal to the 
effect that both sides should withdraw at once and simultaneously and 
then demilitarize the area. Lord Mountbatten asked how the tribesmen 
would be made to withdraw, and Jinnah quickly replied: "If you do this 
I will call the whole matter off. 1129 As to the plebiscite, Jinnah pro-
posed that the two Governor-Generals should themselves step in and con-
duct it, but Lord Mountbatten felt that his constitutional powers did 
not permit him to carry out such responsibilities, and instead proposed 
a plebiscite under United Nations auspicies. Jinnah did not agree. 
Thus the conference failed to achieve a common approach to the dispute 
over Kashmir. 30 
During the following month the two Prime Ministers, Nehru and 
Liaquat Ali Khan, failed to reach a common ground agreement after a 
29Ibid., p. 229. 
3oibid~, pp. 229-230. 
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fruitless exchange of accusations. However, Lord Mountbatten succeeded 
in bringing both Prime Ministers together for the first time since the 
accession of Kashmir. Early in December, a conference was held in Delhi 
during which the two Governments put their proposals into a more formal 
shape. Briefly the proposals presented by both parties provided for the 
following three issues: 
(l) Pakistan should use her influence to persuade the tribal 
invaders to withdraw from Kashmir territory and that the rebel 
"Azad" Kashmir forces stop fighting. 
(2) India should withdraw the "bulk" of her forces. leaving 
few detachments to maintain order, 
(3) The United Nations should be asked to send a commission 
to conduct a plebiscite in Kashmir. 
The meeting broke up without a final decision being reached. 
Matters worsened when the Indian Prime Minister was informed that 
as soon as Liaquat Ali Khan left Delhi reports of large concentrations 
of invaders were confirmed. and that atrocities against non-Muslims in 
Kashmir had increased. This hardened the Indian position so that at the 
Lahore meeting of the Joint Defense Council, which was held during the 
same month and attended by the two Prime Ministers. both parties found 
that complete deadlock had been reached. At this point, Lord Mountbatten 
suggested that the United Nations might be introduced to play the role 
of a third party and this was welcomed by both sides, 31 
That was the state of the Kashmir problem at the beginning of 1948 
when India placed the dispute before the United Nations ·security Council. 
31Ibid., pp. 250-252. 
CHAPTER V 
THE DISPUTE GOES BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS 
Resort to war over a dispute may, under modern conditions of inter-
dependence of nations·and the involved interests of states, precipitate 
a major war. No matter how much destruction war might cause, nations 
would never refrain from using force, as a last resort, if they fee·1 
that a "vital" interest or national "honour" was at stake and that there 
was no other way to safeguard it. In modern times, the maintenance of 
peace and security has become the conc~rn of the entire international 
community, which has developed the necessary international procedures and 
machinery that provide the disputants with a forum for talking out their 
differences. Its efforts should be employed to reach a peaceful settle-
ment .Qn terms sufficiently tolerable to both parties so that the high. 
price of war might be avoided. "The development of international organi-
zations, with specific and continuing responsibilities for conciliation 
on either a region~l or global scale, h~s been the most vital factor in 
promoting a peaceful settlement of disputes. 111 
On the global level, the most important development has been the 
United Natio~s •. It has developed the appropriate machinery and skills 
to be employed in any situation that might arise between states to the 
point where they can be instrumental in avoiding war. The Security 
1Philip E. Jacob and Alexine L. Atherton, ~Dynamics~ Inter-
national Organizations (Illinois, 1965), p. 282. 
46 
47 
Council is designed to be the principal organ for achieving a peaceful 
settlement of international disputes. Under Chapter VI of the Charter, 
the approach of "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" by mutual agreement be-
tween the disputants is prescribed with its techniques of conciliation, 
mediation, or good offices. "The aim of these methods has been to har-
monize rather than to judge the opposing claims, and to achieve an agree-
ment mutually acceptable to all the disputants. 112 In particular, Article 
35 states that any member of the United Nations may refer to the Secur-
ity Council a dispute "the continuance of which is likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security" should it fail a 
direct settlement between the two parties. 
On January l, 1948, India, invoking Article 35 of the Charter of 
the United Nations, went to the Security Council claiming that Pakistan 
had by her invasion of Kashmir committed an act of aggression. India 
told the Council that: 
(a) Pakistan allowed the ''invaders" to transit its territory; 
(b) Pakistan allowed the "invaders" to use its territory as a 
base of operations; 
(c) The "invaders" included Pakistani nationals; 
(d) They drew much of their military equipment, transportation 
and supplies, including petrol, from Pakistan; 
(e) Pakistani officers were training, guiding and otherwise 
actively helping them. 3 
The Government of India requested the Council to ask the Government of 
2Ibid., p. 281 
3(S/628, January 2, 1948), p. 4. 
Pakistan 
(1) To prevent ••• Government personnel, military and civil, 
from participating or assisting in the invasion of the Jammu 
and Kashmir State; 
( 2) To call upon other Paki.stani natio:nals to desist from 
taking any part in the fighting in the Jammu and Kashmir 
State; 
(3) To deny the invaders: (a) access to and use of its 
territory for operations against Kashmir, (b) military 
and other supplies, (c) all other ••• aid that might ••• pro-
long the present struggle.4 
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India's hope to obtain a quick Security Council condemnation of Pak-
istan proved too optimistic. Pakistan sent its newly appointed Foreign 
Minister, Zafrullah Khan, to Lake Success to present Pakistan's case and 
India sent a delegation headed by Gopalswami Ayyangar, a cabinet Minister 
in the Government of India who, a decade previously, had been employed 
by the Maharajah of Kashmir as Prime Minister of the State. 
Pakistan's reply to the Indian charges came in a letter addressed 
to the Secretary-General on January 15, 1948, in which Pakistan invoked 
Article 35 of the Charter and for>mally charged India with a breach of 
international agreements, an "extensive campaign of genocide" and "num-
erous attacks on Pakistan territory," the object of which "is the des ... 
truction of the State of Paki~tan. 115 Pakistan requested the Council to 
(1) Call upon India to desist from acts of aggression against-Pak-
istan and to implement all the agreements related to partition; 
(2) Appoint a commission to investigate all the Pakistani accusa-
tions against India, arrange the stoppage of the fighting, enfor>ce the 
withdrawal of outsiders whether from India or Pakistan, and, finally, 
hold an impartial plebiscite to determine the question of the accession 
4Ibip.., p. 5. 
5CS/646, January 15, 1948), pp. 7-8. 
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of tJ1e State. 6 
As a full and fair hearing of both sides is essential for whatever 
action the United Nations may wish to take, both parties were allowed to 
present the issue to the Council. The sharply different views of the 
two nations, not only on the cause and nature of the dispute but also on 
the ways of solving it, soon became clear to the Council. To India, the 
source of all troubles is the tribal invasion and Pakistan's participa-
tion in it. Therefore, it limited the case before the Security Council 
to these two acts. To Pakistan, the source of all hostilities is to be 
found in the unhappy Indo-Pakistani relations, and therefore its presen-
tation of the case was an exhaustive account of all problems dividing 
India and Pakistan. 
Ayyangar concluded his country's case by declaring: 
We have referred to the Security Council a, simple and 
straightforward issue •••• 
1tooeooo•o•••••••••••••• 
The withdrawal and expulsion of the raiders and the invaders 
from the soil of Kashmir and the immediate stoppage of the 
fight are thus the fi;st and the only tasks to which we have 
to address ourselves. 
Compared to Ayyangar 1 s statement, Zafrullah Khan traced the origins 
of the Kashmir dispute not to the tribal invasion as such, but to the un= 
settled conditions on the sub-continent that led to partition, to the 
communal strife, and to the political struggle of Kashmiris for self-de-
termination and freedom of action against the Maharajah's autocratic rule 
and that the tribal invasion itself was a by-product of these tragic 
conditions. 
6' Ibid. 1 pp. 8-9. 
7 (S/PV 227, January 15, 1948), pp. 21-22. 
To Zafrullah Khan: 
The issue does not appear to us to be either simple or as 
straightforward as the representative of India has tried 
to make out • 
••• it will be necessary to set out before the Secur-
ity Council the whole background of this Kashmir problem. 8 
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Explaining what he meant by the whole background of the Kashmir problem, 
Zafrullah Khan, on January 17, 1948, said: "What is happening in Kashmir 
is a continuance of the process which has reached its culmination in the 
State of East Punjab /the communal strife/ and cannot be divorced from 
it. 119 Zafrullah Khan admitted that several vehicles with Pakistani lie-
ense plates might indeed have been seen in Kashmir, "but surely there is 
a wide gulf between a vehicle or several vehicles bearing Pakistani num-
ber plates being in Kashmir, ••• and the Pakistani Government being respon-
sible for ••• them •••• 1110 To him also it was not surprising to see Poonchis 
serving in the Pakistan Army take part in the fighting while on home 
leave, "these officers ••• find that their people are massacred ••• and if 
some of them take a hand in whatever is going on, it is ••• not a case of 
allowing them to go ••• to take part in the fighting. 1111 He finally agreed 
that as a matter of course every Pakistani, including the members of the 
Government, sympathized with the rebels, for "In these circumstances ••• 
to expect, ••• that because he is a minister a Muslim should not give ex-
pression to his sympathy ••• is to expect either what would be more than 
8Ibid., p. 24. 
9(S/PV 229, January 17, 1948), p. 29. 
lOibid., P• 17. 
11rpid., p. 21.. 
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human or ••• less than human. 1112 
Zafrullah Khan's proposed solution wa.s the military and administra-
tive neutralization of the State until a plebiscite could be held: 
Everyone who has gone into Kashmir should go out: Sikh bands, 
Rashtriya, Sewak Sangh volunteers, other people who have gone 
in, tribesmen, and any other people who may have gone in from 
the Muslim side, and men from Pakistan, Muslims who are Indian 
nationals and who were refugees in Pakistan - everybody. They 
must go out, including Indian troops •••• 
000000000900••••••0••············ 
••• Kashmir must be cleared. Fighting must stop •••• Normal 
administration must be restored. There should be no kind of 
pressure, either from the Muslim Conference being in power and 
holding the administration or the National Conference being in 
power and holding the reins of administration. No kind of 
pressure should be brought upon the people. The people should 
then be invited to express the way in which they want to go1 
and whatever they decide, they should be welcome to do it.l~ 
With the dispute being lifted out of the context of a purely bi-
lateral confrontation and exposed to multilateral, outside influence, 
debate and negotiation became the means by which the positions of govern-
ments can be explained, opposing views modified, public opinion influenc-
ed, and agreement reached where agreement is possible. The United Na-
tions is a deliberative bodY, in which nations talk through their repre-
sentatives. What is common to all cases is that the parties are stub-
born, the debates boring, and the negotiations protracted. 'Yet it is 
through this pragmatic approach that the United Nations actively tries 
. . 
to seek a basis of a common agreement, exploring with the disputants the 
nature of their differences, pointing out where they are not far apart, 
and makipg positive proposals for settlement. 
Acting in the spirit of Chapter VI of the Charter, the United 
12Ibid. 1 p. 22. 
13Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
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Nations entered prolonged negotiations in an effort to find whatever ap-
proach would be most effective in dissuading India and Pakistan from ag-
gravating the situation in Kashmir, and in encouraging them to compro-
mise their differences in order to reach a common-ground agreement. To 
that end, the Security Council can recommend to both parties procedures 
of adjustment and terms of settlement it considers appropriate. Assum-
ing the role of a mediator and so long as it is acting under Chapter VI, 
the Council can only recommend steps to the disputants in an effort of 
finding a peaceful settlement in contrast to undertaking enforcement ac-
tions to meet a breach of the peace or an act of aggression as provided 
under Chapter _VII of the Charter. Therefore, the United Nations' role 
as a peace-maker depends on obtaining the assent and full co-operati~n 
of both parties to the dispute. 
The first action taken by the Security Council came in the form of 
a request sent on January 6, 1948 by the President of the Security Coun-
cil. to both Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan that their countries 
refrain from any action that might aggravate the situation (S/636). 
Then on January 17, 1948, following Zafrullah Khan's opening statement, 
the Security.Council adopted a resolution presented by Belgium calling 
on both parties, India and Pakistan, to take all measures within their 
power to improve the situation and stop any action that would aggravate 
conditions. It further requested them to inform the Council of all sub-
stantial changes in the situation while the matter was being discussed 
by the Security Council (S/651). 
Informal conversations were then begun to reach a compromise settle-
ment. As some measure of agreement was reached, on January 20, 1948; . 
Langenhove, the Belgian President of the Security Council, presented a 
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resolution "on behalf of both ••• parties, who have signified their ap-
proval."14 As adopted by the Security Council, the resolution establish-
ed a commission of three members; one to be selected by India, one by 
Pakistan, and the third by the first two. The Commission was to proceed 
to the sub-continent with the dual function of (l) investigating the 
facts, and (2) exercising "mediatory influence" that would likely ease. 
tensions on both sides (S/654). The resolution creating the Commission. 
is significant because, in addition to the situation in Jammu and Kashmir 
State, the Commission was invested with the power to investigate other 
matters contained in Zafrullah Khan's letter of complaint, dated 15 
January 1948. When the resolution was debated, the Pakistani representa-
tive insisted that the Kashmir question should not be dealt with on a 
piecemeal basis, but that the issue as a wh9le including Pakistan's 
charges against India must be considered. With the support of the Brit-
ish representative, Noel-Baker, and other members of the Council, the 
views of the Pakistani representative prevailed. 
The Pakistani objective of a wider scope of United Nations action 
became more evident on January 22, 1948, when the Security Council agreed 
to change the agenda from the "Jammu and Kashmir Question" to "India-
Pakistan Question". This was a major victory for Pakistan because it 
was adopted against strong Indian objections. Pakistan was highly en~ 
.couraged by the British inclination toward its own view and supported by· 
the Americans who followed the line of the British. In the bitter wrang-
ling that ensued, the conciliatory spirit of the resolution of January 
20 was forgotten. 
14(S/PV 230, January 20 11 1948), p. l. 
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On January 27, 1948 both parties presented their proposals. A 
~ study of the proposals shows that they centered around four basic issues 
which from then on have plagued all the efforts of the United Nations to 
secure a compromise settlement. These issues are: 
(1) The cessation of hostilities. 
(2) The withdrawal of armed forces (demilitarization). 
(3) The interim Government in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
(4) The plebiscite and the role of United Nations in it. 
India pressed for: 
(1) A stoppage of the fighting in Kashmir and the withdrawal of 
the "invaders" whether they were tribesmen or Pakistani nationals. 
(2) The return of the refugees after normal conditions had been 
restored. 
(3) The defense of the state and the maintenance of law and order, 
so essential for a free plebiscite, were the responsibility of the Indian 
Government so long as the State had acceded to India., However, with the 
passage of time, the Indian forces were to be progressively reduced to 
that strength that would still ensure external security and internal 
order. 
(4) A Commission to proceed to India to mediate and supervise the· 
stoppage of the fighting and the cessation of military operations. 
(5) The interim Government under Abdullab's administration was to 
have an elected National Assembly which, in turn, would appoint a Nation-
al Government. 
(6) The National Government was to prepare for a plebiscite to be 
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held under the "advice and observation•• of United Nations personnei.15 
On the other hand, Pakistan, in essence, proposed that: 
(1) An end to hostilities could only be achieved by providing rea-
sonable guarantees to the tribesmen and to the "Azad" Kashmir Government 
that all maltreatment of Muslims would end, and that a free, internation-
ally-controlled plebiscite would be held. 
(2) To that end, the United Nations Commission should arrange for 
the establishment of an impartial administration in the State. 
(3) The withdrawal of all forces - Indian and tribesmen. 
(4) The holding of a plebiscite, organized and fully controlled by 
the United Nations.16 
Thus it would appear that the main cleavage between India and Pakis-
tan at this stage of United Nations' deliberations was this: India in-
sisted that a stoppage of the fighting should be dealt with first; Pakis-
tan asserted that the fighting could not be stopped unless an agreement 
on a plebiscite was reached to guarantee the people that a fair plebis-
cite was forthcoming. In fact, Pakistan revealed some fears that once 
the fighting stopped, there might ensue a~ facto political stabiliza-
tion of the fronts that would end in a partition of the countI'y with. 
India possessing the Valley of Kashmir, which is the most important-sec-
tion in the State. 
It is clear that India and Pakistan stood at the two ends of the 
pole, and it is of a great importance to keep in mind the basic points 
of difference if we are to pass judgment on the exhaustive efforts of.· 
15(s/PV 236, January 28, 1948), pp. 3-4. 
16Ibid., PP• s-s. 
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the United Nations to reach a settlement acceptable to both parties to 
the dispute. Every mediation effort on the part of the United Nations 
had to face the basic irreconcilable attitudes of the parties toward the 
withdrawal of troops, the interim Government in Kashmir, and the role of 
United Nations in holding a plebiscite. 
The Canadian, Belgian, and Colombian representatives at the Secur-
ity Council introduced several draft resolutions, suggestions, amend-
ments, or memoranda in an effort to reconcile the views of India and Pak-
istan. By and large, they were more inclined-to accept the· Pakistani 
point of view on the internationally-controlled plebiscite and the simul-
taneous withdrawal of both forces in order to demilitarize the State. 
On January 29, 1948 the Belgian representative, in a new effort to !'econ-
cile the views of India and Pakistan, suggested that: 
The measures to end acts of hostility and violence on the 
one hand, and the plebiscite on the other, aI"e two aspects 
of the same problem, namely the rr,toration of orde?" and 
tranquility in Jammu and Kashmir. 
Then he proceeded to propose two resolutions to be considered simultan-
eously by the Security Council. One called for a plebiscite "organized, 
held and supervised under /the Council'!,! authority. 1118 The other for 
the stoppage of acts of hostility and violence with instructions to the 
Commission "to take into consideration that, among the duties incumbent 
upon it, are included those which would tend towards promoting the cessa-
tion of acts of hostility and violence, ••• 1119 
All of the members of the Security Council, except the u.s.s.R., 
17 (S/PV 237, January 29, 1948), p. 2. 
18Ibid. 
19Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
expressed their approval. General McNaughton, of Canada, was of the 
opinion that "these draft resolutions, taken together ••• will establish 
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a basis to end the fighting •••• 1120 Noel-Baker, of Great Britain, agreed 
with the representative of the United States, Austin, that "one cannot 
have a cessation of violence unless one has an agreement that satisfies 
everybody that a plebiscite will be free and fair," and in working to-
ward that agreement "the organization of the plebiscite will involve con-
siderations of administration, of the maintenance of law and order, and 
so on. 1121 
Pakistan was in favour of the Belgian draft resolution, but Ayyan-
gar, the representative of India, expressed shock and disappointment • 
. He described the Belgian draft resolution as "innocuous in the extreme", 
and added; "Is this not an illustration of our trying to fiddle here 
while India is burning?1122 A few days later, on February a, 1948, the 
Government of India, bewildered by the United Nations' delay in accept-
ing India's basic complaint that an act of aggression had taken place in 
Kashmir, asked the Indian delegate to return at once to Delhi for fur-
ther consultation. At that time, the Indian Government felt that the 
debate on Kashmir at Lake Success was bogged down into side issues by 
larger maneuvers. They believed that. the Americans were following the 
British, more or less blindly, and that the British took a pro-Pakistani 
side. Nobody even tried to pay attention to the fact that there had 
been an armed aggression. 
20ibid., p. 4. 
21Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
22 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
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The Security Council reconvened on March 8, 1948, following the 
retUI'n of the Indian delegation to Lake Success, and was told by Ayyan-
gar that "our stand on fundamentals would continue to be the same as be-
fore my departure for India. 1123 Tsiang, the Chinese President of the 
Council, following informal discussions with the two parties, submitted 
on March 18, 1948 a draft resolution proposing that "The Government of 
Pakistan undertakes ••• to secure the withdrawal,,,of intruding tribesmen 
and Pakistani nationals;" and that "the Government of India shall ar-
range for the p~ogr,essive withdrawal.,,of such of its troops as are not 
required for the purpose of defense and security. 11 24 India was to be 
given full control over the administratiQn of the State while the United 
Nations personnel were to be assigned a very modest and obscure role. 
Unlike the Belgian draft resolutions of January 29, Tsiang's pro~ 
posals were favourable to India. Ayyangar, commenting on the Chinese 
draft resolution, had this to say: 
••• Mr. Tsiang's draft resolution of 18 March was a 
valiant attempt at a just compromise,,,,It broke away 
courageously from the January-February rusts of argument 
and opinion •••• ! straightaway accepted it since it did 
not commit us to any departure from our fundamentals,25 
Pakistan strongly rejected the Chinese draft resolution, and three days 
later, on March 21', 1948, Dawn, the leading Pakistani newspaper ventured 
-
to hope that: 
The Security,council will show the same sense of realism 
as it did before and in that light view the Chinese at-
tempt at 'compromise' by granting one party /India/ almost 
- -
23 (S(PV 285, April 19, 1948), p. 3, 
24(S/699, March 18, 1948), pp. 1-3, 
25 (S/PV 285), pp. 3-4. 
everything and the other party /Pakistan/ nothing. 26 
- - . 
Finally, after several recesses and much fruitless negotiations, 
the Security Council passed on April 21, 1948 themost significant resol-
ution in the Kashmir question. Jointly sponsored by six delegations, 
Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, it attempted an over-all solution of the Kashmir dispute by fo-
cussing attention on the basic issues of the dispute; the withdrawal of 
forces (demilitarization), the plebiscite, and the interim Government. 
Austin, the representative of the United States and one of the sponsors, 
admitted that "this plan is not a final solution. It does not pretend 
to be more than a recommendation, •• to help these parties in accordance 
with their request. 1127 
In essence, the resolution28 provided for the following: (1) A 
five-man Commission instead of the original three be created with in ... 
structions to proceed immediately to the sub-continent and offer its 
good offices to terminate the hostilities and hold a plebiscite. It was 
to have its military observers and was to report to the Council on 
whether the plebiscite once held was free and impartial. (2) Recommend 
that the Government of Pakistan secure the withdrawal of the tribesmen 
and Pakistani nationals from the State of Kashmir; and that the Govern-
ment of India should, in consultation with the Commission, when it was 
26campbell-Johnson, ~· =.!!_., p. 309. 
27 (S/PV 284), p. 20. 
28The resolution was voted upon paragraph by paragraph. In almost 
every case there were eight votes in favour (Argentina, Belgium, Canada, 
China, France, United Kingdom, and the United States), none against, and 
two absentions (the U.S.S.R. and the Ukraine). Syria voted for those 
provisions favoured by Pakistan. 
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shown that tribesmen were withdrawing, plan for a progressive withdrawal 
of its forces to the minimum strength required for the maintenance of 
law and order. (3) An .interim coalition Government be formed in the 
State from representatives of all the major political parties (i.e., the 
Muslim Conference as well as the National Conference). (4) A plebis-
cite Administrator be nominated by the United Nations Secretary-General, 
with adequate powers to insure the freedom and impartiality of the pleb-
• , 29 
l.SCl.teo 
Both India and Pakistan objected to the Security Council's resolu-
tion. India specifically disputed the following provisions: 
Those portions of the resolution which provided for the 
removal of Indian forces from strategic areas in Kashmir; 
00011000000090•0•00,•9ooo•o•to-o 
The addition of representatives of the Azad Kashmir group 
to Abdullah~s cabinet; 
The sweeping powers of the Plebiscite Administrator. 30 
India was also critical of the Council for not having condemned Pakistan 
as an aggressor. Nehru, in a public meeting at Srinagar, described the 
resolution as a "strange decision on Kashmir, and had failed to take up 
the main issue. 1131 Ayyangar was more critical. He said: 
••• India's complaint was placed in cold storage for nearly 
two months, four months of continued bloodshed and economic 
ruin. And at the end of it all we are exhorted, ••• to agree 
to a resolution niggardly in its recognition of the merits 
of the matter, vague and indefinite in the wording of the 
action to be taken by Pakistan. And in the interpretation 
of that language the Security Council has gone even further 
and been apologetic to Pakistan for reminding it of its duty. 
29 (S/726, April 21, 1948), pp. 8-12. 
30Thor~er, "The Kashmir Conflict,"~· .s.!.!_., p. 176. Quoted Im 
Times of India (Bombay), May 27, 1948. 
31Ibid. 
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India cannot, ••• agree to this treatment of its kind. 32 
Yet, one month later, the representative of India, in a somewhat more 
conciliatory tone, told the Council that: "If, ••• the_Commission is still 
sent out to India ••• the Government of India have already stated that they 
would be glad to confer with it."33 
Pakistan also was not wholly satisfied with the resolution, for to 
Pakistan it did not provide enough conditions guaranteeing the people of 
Kashmir a free and impartial plebiscite. Zafrullah Khan, expressing his 
Government's rejection of the resol1;2tion 9 said that "the continued pres-
ence of the armed forces of India in the State ••• would affect the free-
dom of the plebiscite,"34 and the "continuation of Sheikh Abadullah at 
the head of the Kashmir Government is, ••• bound to influence heavily the 
fairness and impartiality of the plebiscite."35 Yet at the same time 
the Government of Pakistan declared that should the .Council still decide 
to send out the Commission it would be willing to confer with it. 
The more or less outright rejection of the resolution by India and 
Pakistan disappointed the sponsors of the resolution. This was reflec-
ted in the strong criticism of both parties by the Colombian and the 
United States representatives. Austin, of the United States, put it 
this wayi 
We have noticed that there is apparently no sense of obli-
gation on the part of the parties to the case •••• The parties 
come here and engage the very expensive machinery of the U. 
N. and the time of distinguished men from all nver the world, 
32(S/PV 285), p. 12. 
33 (S/PV 30'+, May 26, 1948), pp. 6-7. 
34(S/PV 285), p. 29-30. 
35Ibid., p. 30. 
and there does not seem to be much sense of obligation ;g 
give respect and due rega:i:-d to the judgment arrived at. 
62 
The resolution marked the end of the first phase of United Nations' 
action in the Kashmir dispute. In essence, the main purpose of the res-
olution was to stop the fighting and to establish normal conditions in 
the State that would make it possible for the people to express their 
wishes to accede to either country without any coercion or restraint. 
Acting under Chapter VI of the Charter, the Security Council could not 
impose a final settlement on the parties to the dispute but could only 
pass recommendations with the hope that both sides would agree to them. 
They are permissive rather than mandatory. They could bound the parties 
on a moral basis without any juridical consequences in case of disagree-
ment. The Security Council has no authority to apply sanctions to these 
recommendations. Essentially, "international peace-making has had to 
emphasize persuasion far more than decision in the development of a 
third-party functions. 1137 
Within this framework, all conciliation efforts undertaken by the 
Council have followed a pragmatic approach. The Security Council assur= 
ed both parties of full and fair hearing. Having come to a better under-
standing of the nature of the problem and the issues separating both 
parties, the Council actively tried to discover a basis upon which the 
two protagonists would be willing to negotiate in regard to the issues· 
in the dispute. Thus the Council presented the disputants with a series 
of recommendations. If the initial recommendations were unacceptable by 
one or both of the parties, the Security Council would reconsider the 
36 (S/PV 304, May 26, 1948), p. 20. 
37Jacob and Atherton,~· cit., p. 270. 
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issues and seek to devise another and more positive approach for settle-
ment. For the most part, the Council favoured·exploring all possible 
alternatives that would be most effective in preventing the parties from 
aggravating the situation, and in encouraging them to compromise the,i.r 
differences. 
To that end, the Security Council avoided taking sides in the dis-
pute. Lopez, the Colombian President of the Security Council, told the 
Council: "It is a matter of great disappointment to the Security Coun-
ell to find that, ••• both parties seem to think very definitely that the 
Council has not leaned enough to either side in trying to meet their 
wishes.038 The Council did not yield to India's persistent request to 
condemn Pakistan an aggressor, nor did it consider the basic Indian. con-
tention of the'.legality of accession. 
In fact, the Security Council is not a juridical body, It has no 
saying on who is wrong in regard to the legal aspect of the dispute, 
Lopez reminded both parties that "We did not think that the Security 
council has been invited, or could be invited, to give an opinion on the 
legal merits to this dispute, 1139 Such a consideration would fit into 
the machinery and procedure of the International Court of Justice as 
provided under Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations. Although 
this procedure would seem to assure greater certainty of settlement, as 
~'· 
well as impartial objectivity by determining the merits of the case ac-
cording to objective standards of law or fact, neither party invoked the 
"advisory opinion" of the Court on any legal question. Why they did not 
38(S/PV 286, April 21, 1948), ~· 7. 
39Ibid, 11 p. 6. 
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is a matter of speculation. But it would seem to me that India took the 
legality of accession for granted. To India the Instrument of Accession 
is the embodiment of its legality, which no one could deny or disprove. 
Pakistan on the other hand, was uncertain about a decision in its favour. 
It could not afford taking chances on this big question where its nation-
al "honour" and its "vital interests" were at stake, especially at this 
early stage of nationhood. 
But why is it that the Security Council did not ask the Court for 
such a decision? There is perhaps one explanation; that is, the Secur-
ity Council is a political body and it felt that open diplomacy and medi-
ation might provide a common-ground basis for agreement, whereas to ob-
tain a juridical verdict against either party would have put one of the 
disputants in the position of being wrong. This is not a promising way 
to follow for more cooperation between the two parties to seek a settle-
ment. On the contrary, it might be responsible for a breakdown of all 
conciliation efforts. The Security Council focused on both India and 
Pakistan the political and moral prestige of the United Nations by de-
manding that a settlement must be reached by peaceful means. According-
ly, it passed its mild, non-committal resolution of April 21, 1948. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE UNITED NATIONS AT WORK, 1948-1950 
As stated in the previous chapter, the Security Council, in dealing 
with the Kashmir situation on its merits, created a five-man Commissionl 
and, by resolutions of 20 January and 21 April 1948 1 authorized it to 
serve as a Commission of inquiry, good offices, mediation, and concilia-
tion. This has been the regular practice of the United Nations in most 
of the major crises it has been called upon to handle and, as will be 
shown later, i~ a practice that has both benefits as well as drawbacks. 
Also its success or failure depends so much on the good will of the dis-
putants. 
The success of an international commission offering its good offices 
and seeking conciliation requires the full support of both parties. As 
created, the United Nations Kashmir Commission was composed of members 
chosen by their governments rather than individuals chosen directly by 
the Security Council a~ private experts or technicians. This placed the 
Commission in a very delicate position as it had to demonstrate to the 
disputants and, in this case the Governments of India and Pakistan, its 
complete impartiality and integrity, and its proposals had to be well· 
1The Commission, as finally composed, consisted of five members. 
On February 10 India selected Czechoslovakia to serve on the Commission. 
On April 23 the Security Council nominated Belgium and Colombia, and on 
May 7 Pakistan selected Argentina. On the same day the President of the 
Security Council nominated the United States to serve as the fifth mem-
ber of the Commission. 
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balance~ and practically perfect. Yet the parties had occasion to claim 
that the governments represented on the Commission had a say in its work. 
No wonder that most governments prefer not to serve on such Commissions, 
The Commission heard all the sides involved in the dispute, tried to 
take in all the contingencies of the situation, kept each side informed 
of t~e views of the other, and pleaded moderation hoping by this to make 
the position of one side acceptable to the other. 
Upon its arrival in Karachi, on July 7, 1948, the Commission found 
the situation politically and militarily quite different from what the 
Security Council had thought it to be when it passed its resolution in 
April. Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Zafrullah Khan, informed the Commis-
sion that the "Pakistan Army had at the time three brigades of regular 
troops in Kashmir and that troops had been sent into the State during 
the first half of May. 112 He attributed this Pakistani action to the 
need to protect "the territory of Pakistan from possible aggression by 
India; /the/prevention of a fait accompli in Kashmir by the Government 
.-- ,,. . -
of India; and /the/prevention of the influx of refugees into Pakistan. 113 
- - . 
Following a pattern common to Commissions engaged in the pacific 
settlement of international disputes, the Commission decided that it 
should fil"st mov.e to stop hostilities and then undertake.a settlement of 
the fundamental issues. A truce was an essential first step to prevent 
a major escalation of hostilities and to provide the atmosphere necessary 
for determining the facts, which the Commission considered must first be 
determined if it was to work out a reasonable settlement. Furthel"fflore, 
2(S/llOO, November 9, 1948), Paragraph 40. 
3Ibid., Paragraph 51. 
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the continuance of hostilities in Kashmir would have produced additional 
issues to resolve, such as the rehabilitation of more devastated areas. 
The Commission therefore devoted all its initial efforts to arranging a 
cease-fire to be followed by a truce. In this it succeeded, but it made 
little headway in its efforts at mediation and conciliation. 
The Commission as a first step informally investigated the possi-
bilities of an unconditional cease-fire. Indian officials expressed 
readiness to order a cease-fire provided that Pakistani units were with-
drawn and that Indian forces advanced to occupy strategic places then 
under Pakistani control. Pakistan again insisted on the simultaneous 
withdrawal of Pakistani and Indian troops. 
This lack of common ground did not stop the Commission from explor-
ing all possibilities for an agreement through a series of proposals in 
the hope that by the process of trial and error it, as a third party, 
could explore and suggest terms which would satisfy both governments. 
On August 13, 1948 the Commission decided it was ready to put some of 
its proposals ~n writing. It formulated a plan calling for a truce 
agreement-to be worked out immediately following a cease-fire order. To 
satisfy the basic Pakistani demand, the Commission linked th~ cease-fire 
with preparations for a final settlement of the dispute (the plebiscite), 
and provided for the withdrawal of Pakistani troops and tribesmen to 
satisfy the Indian demands. It also required India to withdraw the 
"bulk" of its forces, leaving behind Indian troops required for the 
maintenance of law and order. 
While India accepted the Commission's plan, Pakistan made its ac-
ceptance subject to several reservations, qualifications, and assump-
tions, and the Commission had to c;onsider them as amounting to a refusal. 
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Bitterly disappointed with the results of its first attempts, the Com-
mission left the sub-continent for Geneva and there prepared its first 
findings report to the Security Council. The Commission reported that 
both countries were suspicious of each other's moves and motives, as 
India was afraid Pakistan would violate the truce, while Pakistan was 
afraid that with a cease-fire India would stabilize her position and so 
in time produce a~ facto division of Kashmir with the Valley of Kash-
mir left in her possession. 
It is difficult to criticize the Commission's work because "If the 
usefulness of international mediatorial agencies depends upon the dispo-
sition of the States to use them it depends also upon their willingness 
to be used. 114 Good faith and good will are prerequisites for a fruitful 
mediation effort, especially here where the Commission had no power to 
impose anything upon either party. In renewed efforts to break the 0 im-
passe, the Commission held a number of meetings with the representatives 
of India and Pakistan who were then in Paris attending the Paris session 
of the United Nations General Assembly. Both sides complained of in-
creased milit~ry activities, so the Commission secured the approval of .. 
both countries to the appointment of a military-adviser who would immed-
iately proceed to the sub-continent. This was a great advance in the 
Commission's mediatory efforts as it marked the beginnings of the United 
Nations military observers corps which ultimately brought about the ces-
sation of hostilities. 
Sensing a more favourable atmosphere, the Commission, on December 
11, 1948, submitted to the parties a supplement to the August 13 plan in 
4Inis L. Claude, Swords Into Plowshares (New York, 1966), p. 213. 
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which it specifically proposed a plebiscite hoping this would satisfy 
Pakistan's demand for a free and impartial plebiscite, Both governments 
accepted the Commission's proposals of December ll, A cease-fire agree-
ment along the then stabilized military front was .:made effective ion 
January 1, 1949, and the Commission's proposals were formally accepted 
by the parties on January 5, 1949, Military observers were sent to as-
sist in an on the spot determination and final demarcation of the cease-
fire line, and to supervise and investigate its violation, On March 24, 
1949, the Secretary-General selected United States Admiral Chester Nim-
itz as a Plebiscite Administrator, but he was unable to begin work be-
cause of a subsequent deadlock over demilitarization questions, and he 
soon resigned, The tribesmen started withdrawing early in 1949, 5 
Before long the Commission found that the days of compromise were 
practically over. Both parties began to give different interpretations 
to the January agreement. To India the "local authorities" who were to 
administer the Northern area of Kashmir meant the State Government of 
Sheikh Abdullah, so India insisted that the ''Azad" Kashmir Government 
had ceased to exist; whereas to Pakistan the "local authorities" were 
the "Azad" Kashmir forces and insisted that the Maharajah's Government .. 
had no authority over the territory of the ''Azad" Kashmir Government. 
Disagreement also arose over the old problem of demilitarization. 
Having exhausted all possible avenues of mediation, the Commission, 
on August 26, 1949, asked the parties to submit their differences on im-
portant issues to arbitration, This move was supported by President 
5This period of the Commission's activities from the date of its 
retUI'n to Geneva on 25 September 1948, to the date of its adoption of 
the January 5 plan, is covered in the Commission's Second Interim Report 
(S/1196) submitted to the Security Council on January 10, 1949, 
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Truman of the United States and Prime Minister··Attlee of Britain, who 
in formal notes to India and Pakistan suggested that "the Kashmir issue 
should be settled by arbitration by a high and impartial personage ap-
pointed by the United Nations - Admiral Nimitz. 116 Pakistan accepted the 
Commission's arbitration proposal; India rejected it. 
Once more the situation was deadlocked. The Commission had labored 
for months to prepare its August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949 plans to 
serve as a basis for a final settlement, and arbitration of the differ-
ences seems to have become the only possible suggestion. The Commission, 
realizing the limits of its powers, and in the very act of confessing its 
inability to proceed any further, made the two parties realize that the 
time had come for them to assume responsibility for the consequences of 
their actions. The Commission had by now played the role of'amediator 
and a conciliator and had offered its good offices to both parties in a 
determined attempt to bring about a political settlement acceptable to 
both sides. It is clear that the Commission was not motivated by a sense 
of abstract justice nor guided by legal formulas of what is just and what 
is unjust. It was motivated by the ideals of fairness and decency and 
political realism which it felt were more appropriate in creative politi-
cal processes. Yet the Commission failed because political wisdom and 
decency are only meaningful if the par~ies themselves are ready to go 
along. The Commission's two plans could not be implemented due to the 
lack ·of mutual trust between the two governments, their totally different 
outlooks on the nature and meaning of the dispute, and the lack of good 
will and cooperation. Neither party found it possible to make 
6oas, ~· cit. , p. 277 • 
concessions and both were dogmatic in their over-all evaluation of the 
situation. In its Third Interim Report, submitted to the Council on 
December 9, 1949• the Commission had this to tell the Council: 
The roots of the Kashmir dispute are deep; strong under-
currents= political, economic, religious - in both Dominions 
have acted, and do act, against an easy and prompt solution 
of this outstanding dispute between India and Pakistan. These 
currents, which at this early stage of national formation are 
often antagonistic, account to a considerable degree for the 
misgivings, reluctance, and hesitancy which the Commission 
felt were often present in the negotiations and which re-
stricted both Governments in the concessions which they might 
otherwise have been prepared to make to facilitate agreement. 7 
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The Commission recommended to the Council that the entire problem be put 
in the hands of a single United Nations mediator with broad powers to 
solve all the unresolved basic issues. The Commission was not sure this 
would work out, so it recommended that in the event the mediator fails 
the case be submitted to compulsory arbitration. 
The Commission does not seem to have come out with clean hands. 
Its whole approach to the problem was over-cautious and highly non-com-
mittal. It is true that it handled the problem impartially, that its 
recommendations were just and fair, and that it showed high devotion to 
duty in its efforts to reach a settlement. This is exemplified in the 
feelings of the American delegate who, speaking with tears in his eyes, 
"pledged all his efforts to the noble and honorable task with which he 
had been entrusted."8 On the whole, the Commission c:loes not seem to 
have handled the situation adequately, for instead of simplifying certain 
matters it complicated them. The Commission resorted to vague and am-
bigious generalities that were hard to define, such as the "bulk" of 
7(S/l430, December 9, 1949), Paragraph 278. 
8Korbel, .2• ~·, p. 119. 
72 
forces, the "surveillance" of the Commission, and the "local authorities," 
The Commission did not only produce lack of understanding and faulty com-
munication, but also triggered a chain of unnecessary and endless contro-· 
versies that were among the principal reasons for the complete impasse 
over the question of demilitarization. Nehru himself was so much dis-
turbed that he kept demanding additional clarifications and explana-
tions. Every now and then, both India and Pakistan asked for a precise 
definition.of terms. 
However, in defense of the Commission, one might say that the Com-
mission was cautious, non-committal, and timid because it wanted to 
prove its impartiality and gain for itself the label of trustworthiness 
which would have been highly beneficial in pursuing its mediatory func-
tions. Things did not seem to have worked out as the Commission wanted 
them to be, The Communist delegate from Czechoslovakia presented a mi-
nority (one member) report criticizing the whole work of the Commission 
for exceeding its mediatory powers when it proposed arbitration, for-to 
him the move was Anglo-American inspired. 
Along the same lines, Nehru attacked the Anglo-American initiative 
in pressing for arbitration. At a public meeting on September 4, 1949; 
Nehru said that "no attempt had been made by the Foreign Powers to under-
stand and solve the fundamental issues involved in the Kashmir ques-
tion."9 He even questioned the applicability of arbitration as an ap-
proach for the settlement of a "great" political question like the Kash-
mir dispute. Nehru's attitude provides students of international poll-
tics with another e~ample of a basic phenomenon of power politics in the 
9 . ' Karunakaran, "India.In World Affairs," !?E.• .s!!.•, p •. _144. 
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relations of nations, that crucial political issues affecting the over-
all balance of power between two nations cq11 hardly ever be solved by 
judicial means, and that states are reluctant to submit questions affect-
ing their national interests to arbitration because they want to retain 
full control over the ultimate terms of settlement_ which they can not 
exercise in the arb.itration process, "For this reason, most states have 
carefully excluded 'vital interests' as arbitral issues, and have insist-
ed on complete discretion on deciding whether a dispute concerned vital 
10 interests." No one would have expected Nehru to take a step which 
might have lessened his chances of winning the case, for there was too 
much pressure on the domestic level against taking any step in that dir-
ection, and no one would have expected Nehru to take chances in the is-
sue so long as India was in possession of the most important part of 
Kashmir, the Valley of Kashmir, 
To India, the decisions of the Security Council taken with the full 
support of the Great Powers were a serious departure from the fundament-
al issue in the dispute, which to India was the aggression against Kash-
mir. That is why there was a growing feeling in India that the whole 
issue suffered from Great Power politics, especially America's struggle 
to contain Communism in South East Asia. This produced wide-spread sus-
picion and loss of faith in the United Nations even in governmental 
circles in India, and explains why India later disregarded the Council's 
resolution and officially annexed that part of the State under its occu-
pation. The Commission, having informed the Security Council of its 
failure, was dissolved and its functions were transferrred to a single 
10 Jacob and Atherton, ~· ~. , p. 273. 
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mediator. The Security Council, burdened with other explosive situations 
in Palestine, Indonesia, and Czechoslovakia, was content with the cease-
fire and showed reluctance to take any further action that would risk de-
terioration in the situation. The Council, accordingly, did not go be-
yond the two plans of the Commission which India and Pakistan had accept--
ed. Its subsequent efforts were centered mainly on demilitarization to-
be followed by a plebiscite in the State of Kashmir. On December 17, 
1949, the Council instructed General McNaughton of Canada to act in his 
capacity a.s President of the Council to hold informal talks with the 
parties, to examine the possibilities of finding a mutually satisfactory 
basis for a settlement, and then report to the Council. This was the 
first time the Security Council had used this procedure in its efforts 
to bring about a peaceful settlement of an international dispute. ·The .· 
use of the President as a go-between, mediator, and a rapporteur, was a 
distinguishing new.feature of the way the Kashmir question was being 
handled by the Security Council. 
At the request of both parties, the President of the Security Coun-
cil prepared proposals for demilitarization of the disputed area prior 
to the holding of a plebiscite. Essentially, General McNaughton's pro-
posals provided for the withdrawal of all the Pakistani and Indian forces 
not required for the maintenance of law and order on the Indian sideof 
the cease-fire line, the disbanding of the local forces of the State 
Government as well as those of the "Azad" Kashmir Government, and the in-
clusion of the Northern area in this progranune of demilitarization with 
the administration continuing under the local authorities with United 
Nations' supervision. Pakistan accepted the proposals, but India again 
strongly reiterated its critical attitude and rejected them. 
--
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Benegal N. Ran, the Indian delegate, put it this way to the ·Secur-
i ty Council: 
/General McNaughton's proposals7 completely ignore the 
legal-and moral aspects of the question. The Indian ·Army 
went into the State at the request of the lawful Government 
of the State in order to repel an actual admitted invasion by 
tribesmen and Pakistani nationals •••• Is it a matter of sur-
prise that India has been unable to accept them as they 
stand?ll 
A week later, Sheikh Abdullah attacked the United Nations attitude to-
ward the Kashmir problem. He said: 
After my return from the U.S.A., I have been more than ever 
convinced that the solution of the Kashmir problem does not 
lie in Lake Success, ••• ! have been reassured in my belief 
that the strength and unity of.our1~eople alone can·defeat 
the intrigues against our freedom, · 
Bakshi Ghulam Mohamed, the Acting Prime Minister of Kashmir, was even 
more bitter in his attack. He described McNaughton's proposals as "a 
subtle and sinister method of throwing the entire State at the mercy of 
Pakistan raiders," and added: 
Our faith in the United Nations has been shaken. Sir Alex-
andar Cadogan, the British delegate to the Security Council, 
is endorsing the views of Pakistan •••• 'l'hey want that Kashmir 
should go to Pakistan. But so long as a single Kashmir! is 
alive, McNaughton's formula will not be accepted.13 
Pakistan strongly reacted to this outright Indian rejection. The 
Working Committee of the Punjab Muslim League in a resolution urged the 
Pakistani Government to have the Security Council immediately set a 
definite date for holding an impartial plebiscite. The resolution at-
tributed "the inordinate delay in settling the Kashmir question •• •Lt~ 
ll(s/PV 463, February 7, 1950), pp. 10, 17. 
12The Statesman, February 12, 1950, p. 7. 
13The Hindustan Times, March l, 1950, p. 1. 
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the Indian leaders" and warned that "If the Security Council fails to 
accomplish its duty, Pakistan should reconsider its decision to remain 
a member of the United Nations or take an independent step for the solu-
tion of the tangle. 1114 Thus Zafrullah Khan, at a press conference on 
February 14, 1950, declared that his Government was finding it "very 
difficult to deal with the delicate situation in Pakistan resulting 0 from 
the Kashmir deadlock and the people's feeling that no plebiscite would 
be held for sometime."15 
Another United Nations mediatory effort had failed, and General 
McNaughton asked the Council to end his mission and recommended that a 
United Nations Representative be appointed with wide powers to carry out 
the Council's decision. On March 14, 1950 the Security Council appoint-
ed a United Nations Representative to replace-both the President and the 
Commission. The principal duties of the Representative were to assist 
in the preparation of and to supervise the implementation of a plan -foI' 
progressive demilitarization as provided for in McNaughton's proposals; 
to be at the disposal of the two governments for consultation and sugges-
tion; to exercise all the powers and responsibilities formerly vested in 
the Commission; and to arrange at the appropriate stage of demilitariza-
tion for the Plebiscite Administrator to start his assigned functions. 
Pakistan accepted the resolution; India reluctantly accepted it subject 
to the reservations it had already made with regard to the McNaughton 
proposals. 
This reluctant acceptance of the resolution by India needs an 
14!!!!, Statesman, February 12, 1950, p. 7. 
15Ibid., February 15, 1950, p. 4. 
77 
explanation. The records of the Security Council debate show that India 
felt it was time to start making certain concessions as most, if not all, 
of the speeches were inclined more toward the Pakistani viewpoint than 
toward the Indian viewpoint. Not only were the permanent members of the 
Council (Great Britain, China, United States, France, with the Soviet 
Union neutral so far) favourable to Pakistan's attitude, but also the·.· 
elected members were closer to Pakistan's viewpoint than to India. Some 
supported Pakistan's position on demilitarization and the plebiscite, 
and some, like the Middle Eastern Muslim countries, even committed them-
selves to supporting the Pakistani casa. The Pakistani case was more 
convincing to these members as it appeared more reasonable to demilitar-
ize the area prior to holding a plebiscite under United Nations auspicies. 
India had to change its delegate and so dispatched Sir Bengal N. Rau to 
replace Ayyangar. Basically, Indiavs position was not different from 
that of Pakistan, for India had admitted to the Council that the acces-
sion of the State was conditional on a free and impartial plebiscite to 
be held when law and order were restored. Pakistan kept insisting on a 
free and impartial plebiscite to determine the final accession of the 
State, and in this Pakistan had an advantage. India's reluctant accept-
ance of the resolution was mainly a recognition on her part of the 
strength of world opinion and the pressure of the world organization as 
backed by the Great Powers in the Council. 
On April 12, 1950 the Security Council appointed Sir Owen Dixon, a 
prominent Australian jurist, as a United Nations Representative for 
India and Pakistan. Resort to direct mediation by an individual media-
tor is a procedure which the United Nations has followed in most major 
crises. The classic procedure is for the mediator to explore and seek 
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to understnad the basis of the controversy through direct, face-to-face 
negotiations with the parties, propose procedures for further fruitful 
negotiations, and in certain cases propose possible terms of settlement 
based on his evaluation of the issues and within the context of the Se-
curity Council resolutions. The effectiveness of this approach has de-
pended basically on the nature of the question, the kind of people assoc-
iated with it, and an assortment of other factors. If a nation felt 
that a "vital interest" was involved and was so vital that no concessions 
or compromises could be considered, and the other nation felt the same 
thing, direct mediation naturally was of questionable value. Equally 
important was the personality of the mediator and the nature of responsi-
bility assigned to him, for "A most vital asset in the task of concilia-· 
tion is the initial trust of the disputants in the mediator. If he can 
start with such trust, ••• he can act with much greater speed and ef-
fect.nl6 This is well illustrated in the case of two successive United 
Nations mediators in Kashmir: Sir Owen Dixon and Dr. Frank Graham who 
followed him. 
The first Indian reaction to the appointment of Sir Owen was one of 
deep pessimism. Shiekh Abdullah, on March 19, 1950, told a press con-
ference in Calcutta that the replacement of the Commission by a single 
mediator "would not at all change the position we have all along been 
taking with regard to the dispute," and added: "If /the U.N. Representa-
tiv~ tries to base his proposals on the McNaughton's formula, failure 
is certain.nl? In Pakistan the reaction was one of marked optimism 
16Jacob and Atherton, 22..• £!!•, p. 316. 
17!!!! Statesman, March 20, 1950, p. l. 
coupled with a feeling of impatience. Liaquat Ali Khan, while on a 
visit to the United States in 1950, said: 
More than two years have elapsed, but the free, im-
partial plebiscite that we are all waiting for is not 
just quite within sight, We trust that the recent appoint-
ment of Sir Owen Dixon ••• to prepare the ground for a pleb-
iscite will expedite matters. 8 
79 
Unfortunately, events showed that Sir Owen was not in a position to 
make Liaquat Ali Khan's wishes come true due to the continuing disagree-
ment between India and Pakistan over the questions of demilitarization 
and the plebiscite. He wasted three months trying to make the two par-
ties agree to a plan for an over-all demilitarization of the State of 
Kashmir, but without success. He finally proposed the partition of the 
State19 with the plebiscite restricted to the Kashmir Valley, India was 
willing to consider the plan subject to additional territorial demands 
which Sir Owen said "appeared to me to go much beyond what,· according to 
my conception of the situation, was reasonable •••• ,,2o Pakistan agreed 
to consider the suggested settlement, "provided that it /Pakista!Y took 
the Kashmir Valley."21 Nehru would not agree to this, Sir Owen there-
upon left the sub-continent on August 23, 1950, and in the concluding 
part of his report to the Security Council he reiterated his belief in 
partition as the best possible solution in the circumstances, pointing 
to the deep-rooted geographical, ethnical, religious, and economic 
heterogeniety of the State, Having given up all hopes for mediating the 
lSibid., May 9, 1950, p. 1. 
19He proposed that continguous Muslim-majority areas would go to 
Pakistan, and that contiguous Hindu-majority areas would go to India. 
~O(S/1791), p. 15 • 
. 
21Ibid., p. 16. 
issue, he suggested that it would be better to have the parties them-
selves seek agreement by airect negotiations: 
The whole question has now been thoroughly discussed by the 
parties with the Security Council, the Commission and myself, 
and the possible methods of settlement have been exhaustively 
investigated. It is perhaps best that the initiative should 
now pass back to the parties, 22 
Sir Owen was also very critical of the attitude of both parties: 
So far the attitude of the parties had been to throw the 
whole responsibility upon the Security Council or its repre-
sentatives of settling the dispute, notwithstanding that, 
except by a~eement between them, there was no means of 
settling it.23 
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By and large, Sir Owen should not be criticized for his concluding 
remarks. He was logical in his approach to the whole question with its 
unresolved complications. He showed a sense of realism in appraising 
the United Nations' ability to reach a compromise settlement to the dis-
pute. The Government of India, with the marked advantage of being in 
possession of the Valley, did not agree to these restrictions on its ·· 
powers which the United Nations' Representative felt were essential to 
an independent and free expression of the wishes of the people concerned. 
The United Nations was at no time given the means to force a final set-
tlement, so realistically all.that the United Nations could do was to ac-
cept the temporary division of the State along the cease-fire line and 
leave the issues to the parties themselves to settle by agreement. Sir 
Owen presented a convincing case for partition and a limited plebiscite 
in the Kashmir Valley, as .he felt.that an over-all plebiscite would·re-
sult in another refugee problem and in increasing tension on both sides. 
221bid., p. 23. 
23Ibid. 
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To Sir Owen the real issue was not the plebiscite, but how to prevent 
another war between India and Pakistan and how best to promote and en-
sure peace and security on the Indian sub-continent. With the pa.ssage 
of time, the cease-fire line became stabilized, and with the United Na-
tions military observers checking incidents along the line to prevent 
the resumption of hostilities, the line became for all practical pur-. 
poses the frontier .between the two countries. 
Sir Owen tried hard to deal with the situation in an impartial and 
fair way. Although he considered the presence of Pakistani forces in 
Kashmir a violation of international law and demanded their withdrawal 
as an essential step for the over-all demilitarization of Kashmir, yet 
he did not go all the way in support of the Indian basic contention that 
Pakistan was an aggressor. Obviously, Sir Owen could not have done:so 
if he was seeking a peaceful settlement through a compromise agreement. 
Had he accepted the Indian point of view his action would, with all prob-
ability, have led to a chain of reactions that would have hindered any· .. 
possible future settlement. 
) 
Finally, to be fair and just to Sir Owen, one should not forget the 
world situation under which he was operating. The Koren war w~ich broke 
out in the summer of 1950 no doubt affected his peace mission to a great 
extent. The deterioration in the situation in the Far East contributed 
to a general feeling of insecurity in Centr.al Asia, and made the chances 
of success of his mission very meagre. It also appears that the way the 
Security Council handled the Korean war contributed to a stiffening in 
India's. critical attitude toward the United Nations' actions in Kashmir. 
From then on Indian officials began to.make elaborate comparisons b~tween 
the attitude of the United Nations toward the Korean war and its attitude 
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toward the Kashmir question, and insisted that if the United Nations 
found it fit to describe the North Korean Communists as aggressors, then 
Pakistan should have received the same treatment. India's loss of faith 
in the United Nations had in fact reached its climax. It is not surpris-
ing therefore that India unilaterally proceeded, in spite of the Secur-
ity Council's resolutions, to incorporate that part of the State under 
its occupation within the Indian Union. This will be considered in the 
following chapter together with the work of the second mediator Dr.•· 
Frank Graham. 
/ 
CHAPTER VII 
THE KASHMIR SCENE CHANGES 
No action was taken following Sir Owen Dixon's failure until Janu-
ary 1951 1 when the Commonwealth Prime Ministers informally discussed the 
conflict in London. Britain, fearing Indian criticism, did not play a 
major role. Three alternative proposals were submitted by the Austra-
lian Prime Minister, Robert Gordon Menzies, namely, the stationing in -
Kashmir of (a) a Commonwealth force; or (b) a joint Indo-Pakistan force; 
or (c) a local force to be raised by the Plebiscite Administrator. India 
rejected them all.1 The Commonwealth countries from then on kept out of 
the dispute, fearing an Indian withdrawal from the association. 
India, having lost faith in the United Nations' action, unilater~ 
ally proceeded to annex its part of the State, On October 27, 1950, the 
Jammu and Kashmir National Conference adopted a resolution urging the 
State Government to convene a Constituent Assembly in order to decide on 
affiliation and political structure of the State. Pakistan's protest to 
the Security Council did not produce any action. All the seventy-five 
members of- the Constituent Assembly were elected unopposed; as Korbel 
puts it: "No dictator could do better."2 ·India then in a position to 
consolidate its position in Kashmir by utilizing the so-called popularly 
1 Korbel, .21:?.• £!:5.·• pp. 176-177. 
2 ' Ibid., p. 222. 
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elected Assembly, which was nothing more than the puppet of India, and 
using it as the basis for legal actions. India's action shut the door 
before any possible intervention by the United Nations or claim by Pakis-
tan. This is what the Chairman of the Assembly seems to have had in 
mind when, on October 31, 1951, he declared: " ••• Kashmir was not inter-
ested in the United Nations, which was the victim of international in-
trigues. The path of Kashmir and U.N. lay in different directions •••• "3 
The latest developments in Korea which brought China into the war 
made the Western Powers more than ever before feel the need for peaceful 
settlement of the dispute over Kashmir. With China on one frontier, 
Tibet on the other, Kashmir was to the West Communism's northern gateway 
to the strategic and rich Indian sub-continent. The Western Powers 
clearly could not afford a continuation of the tension between India and 
Pakistan. On March 30, 1951 the Security Council again tried to do some-
thing when it adopted the Anglo-American resolution designating a new .. 
United Nations Representative to expedite the demilitarization of the 
State of Kashmir and it required recourse to arbitration in case of 
failure. A month later Dr. Frank Graham was appointed United Nations 
Representative in Kashmir. 
When Pakistan accepted the resolution and India rejected it, the 
failure of the resolution was almost certain. Nehru described the reso-
lution as "most extraordinary and objectionable," and "a challenge to 
India's self..i.respect. 114 A few days earlier, in addressing the Indian 
Parliament, he reasserted India's stand on the question of Paramountcy 
3Ibid. 
4The Hindustan Times (New Delhi)s April 3, 1951, p. l. 
and the status of Princely India, He said: 
Kashmir had at no time been recognized as a state under 
international law, but had been an integral part of India. 
Partition made no difference to our responsibilities in 
regard to Kashmir as long as it did not deliberately accede 
to Pakistan.5 
At a press conference, Nehru accused the Uni.ted States and Britain of 
having "completely lost the capacity to think and judge anything," and 
added: "No organization and no country has any business to interfere 
with what is done in Kashmir by India or the Kashmir people. 116 The 
United Nations' action was to India nothing more than intervention in 
the internal. affairs of Kashmir and, in turn, an infringement of the 
sovereign rights of India. 
In Pakistan the atmosphere was laden with tension. People demon-
strated against the United Nations and calls for Jihad (holy war) were 
heard. In Karachi a conference of Muslim leaders, Mutamar el-Alam el-
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Islami (The Muslim World Conference), met in February 1951 and the dele-
gates adopted a resolution urging their home governments to support the 
Pakistanis in their struggle for Kashmir. Dr. Mustafa Subai, Chief Dele-
gate of Syria, assured the Pakistanis of the full support of the whole 
Muslim world and warned them against reliance on the United Nations or 
the Anglo-American bloc, He said: "In the valleys of Kashmir, it is 
not Pakistan alone which has her honor at stake, but the whole Moslem 
world."7 India retaliated by charging Pakistan before the Security 
Council.with violations of the cease-fire and accused her of anti-Indian. 
5Korbel, ~·~.,pp. 182-183. 
6Ibid., Quoted in !!!!.Hindu, June 12, 1951. 
7Lilienthal, ~· ~·, p. 56, 
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pro-Jihad propaganda •. Pakistan's Prime Minister protested and declared 
that 90 per cent of the Indian Army was massed along Pakistan's border. 
In no time both nations had their troops massed on both sides of the 
border, but the crisis passed. 
Early in June 1951 and in this inauspicuous atmosphere, Dr. Frank. 
Graham proceeded to the sub-continent. His mission was limited to the 
demilitarization of the State as a pre-requisite for a plebiscite. With-
in three years of mediation, Dr. Frank Graham submitted to the Security 
Council five reports8 without achieving an agreement between the two 
parties. The principal points of difference were the size of the forces 
which each could maintain after demilitarization and the time the Plebis-
cite Administrator should assume his duties. 9 Dr. Frank Graham found 
himself in the same position that his predecessor, Sir Owen Dixon, was 
in back in 1951, and throughout his mediatory efforts, he became aware 
of the deep-seated differences underlying the Indian and Pakistani ap-
proach to the dispute. The differences we:r>e manifestations of funda-
mental issues which are anchored in the origin and meaning of the Kash-
mir dispute to both parties as well as the proper role of the United 
Nations. Dr. Graham, on October 10, 1952 1 had this to tell the Council: 
••• the narrowing of the differences ••• to one main 
8(S/2375, October 15, 1951); (S/2448, December 19, 1951); (S/264, 
April 22, 1952); (S/2783, September 19, 1952); (S/2967, March 27, 1953). 
9At the beginning he proposed that 12,000 to 18,000 soldiers be 
stationed on the Indian side, plus 6,000 men of the local state militia; 
and 3,000 to 69000 Azad soldiers on the Pakistani side, plus 3,500 scouts 
in the Northern area. Then he modified it to 18 1 000 and 6,000 troops 
respectively. India insisted on 21,900 soldiers excluding the state _ 
militia, and insisted on·a complete demilitarization of the Azad forces 
and its substitution by a civil force of 4,000 .(half armed and the other 
half unarmed). In his final proposals he increased the number of Indian 
soldiers to 21,000, and the Azad troops were limited to 6,000. 
point, upon which the whole plan depends, emphasizes the 
depth of the difference on this point •••• It is related to 
the different conceptions of the two Governments ••• relat-
ing (l) the status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, (2) 
the nature of the responsibilities on each side of the 
cease-fire line after demilitarization, and (3) the obli-
gations of the two Governments under the two agreed ••• 
~lan!f of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949.10 
The fundamental differences in 1953 were the same differences of 1948 
and Dr. Graham, like his predecessor Sir Owen in 1951, found himself 
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recommending direct negotiations between the two Governments. He express-
ed the hope: 
••• may the leadership of 400 million people, with the 
goodwill and assistance of the United Nations, join in nego-
tiating and reporting an agreement on Kashmir and thereby 
light a torch along the difficult path of the people's 
pilgrimage toward peace.ll 
The United Nations does encourage all efforts outside the organiza-
tion whenever other possible instrumentalities have been exhaustively 
used. It, however, resorts to this procedure only when the situation 
reaches the stage where the dispute is no longer threatening to errupt 
into a major outbreak of hostilities. In Kashmir the cease-fire line 
established and effectively supervised by the United Nations had eased 
the tension, and the effective observance of the cease-fire agreement by 
both parties showed that they were not after the resumption of major 
hostilities. Only when hostilities are resumed does the United Nations 
intervene and this is what happened late in 1965. 
What happened in Kashmir between the time of the failure of the 
Graham mission and the 1965 flare up? In the "Azad" Kashmir side of the 
cease-fire line political conditions had been relatively .smooth. Most, 
10cs/PV 605, September 10, 1952), p. 42. 
11(S/2967, March 27, 1953), pp. 14-15. 
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if not all, the non-Muslim population mo~ed to the other part of the 
State. The "Azad" l<ashrnir Government, which is supported by the Muslim 
Conference Party, ·is in cha~ge of local ,affair~, while ,postal and tele-
graph services, defense, and foreign affairs are run by the Pakistani 
Government through the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs. The system of 
government based upon general democratic principles which was promised 
in June 1954 has not yet come into being. In the northern mountainous 
parts of the State, where the population is scarce and communications 
are poor, political power is, for all practical purposes, exercised by 
local chieftains. It is safe to say that the Western and North-western 
parts of Jammu and l<ashmir are virtually a part of Pakistan. 
On the Indian side of the cease-fire line political conditions were 
far from being smooth. Anxious to safeguard the autonomous status of 
Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah in April 1952 refuted the applicability of the 
Indian constitution to the State, and following negotiations with Nehru, 
declared in July 1952 that the status of Kashmir was different from the 
other Indian States. Both agreed that the Supreme Court of India was 
not the final court of appeal for l<ashmir; the Indian President's power 
to declare a state of emergency in l<ashmir was only to be exercised with 
the consent of its Government; and that the State was to continue to have 
its separate flag.12 In November 1952 Sheikh Abdullah had the Constitu-
ent Assembly abolish the Dogra hereditary rule and replace it with an 
elected Head of State. 
Sheikh Abdullah's actions and views contributed greatly to his down-
fall. His policies did not appeal to certain parts of the State, 
12 Korbel, 2£.• .£!!.•, pp. 224-225. 
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particularly in East Janunu where sections of the population wanted 
closer ties with India and considered his radical economic program a 
threat to their interests. Demonstrations for complete integration with 
India were followed by a split in Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference 
Party. On August 9, 1953, Bakshi Ghulam Mohanunend, the Acting Prime 
Minister, took over and put Shei,kh Abdullah in prison and, except for 
a short period of freedom in 1958, Sheikh Abdullah remained in prison· 
until 1965 when he was released, only to be rearrested a few month later. 
The new Government of Bakshi step by step led the State toward full and 
complete integration with India, and on March 30, 1965, the Kashmir Con-
stituent Assembly passed the !!Integration Bill," which formally made 
Kashmir a State in India. This sparked the uprising in the early days 
of August 1965. 
Developments in Indian Kashmir produced endless repercussions in 
Pakistan. While the people were demonstrating and demanding the use of 
force, the Pakistani Government was trying by all ways and means to pre-
vent the full integration of Indian Kashmir into the Indian Union and 
somehow get the long discussed and promised plebiscite implemented. Up= 
on Dr. Graham's recommendation of direct negotiation, Prime Ministers 
Nehru and Mohammed Ali (the new Pakistani Prime Minister) met in New 
Delhi in the summerlof 1953 and affirmed that the future of the State 
should be decided a1cording to the wishes of the people, but early in 
1954 the United States announced its agreement to give military aid to 
Pakistan, and India immediately declared that the United States' action 
had put the whole qfestion of relations between India and Pakistan, in-
I 
eluding the Jammu ahd Kashmir question, in a different light. At the 
Co1ombo Conference fn Ap>'i11954 Nehru opposed aU the Pakistani efforts 
I 
I 
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to discuss the dispute.13 
Pakistan countered this with stronger association with the United 
States as a military ally. Pakistan first subscribed to the Manila 
Treaty (SEATO) and to the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO), mainly·out of a de-
sire to secure international support in its quarrel with India. India, 
in turn, began to view the dispute as a crucial matter invoking military 
alliances that could affect the whole balance of power in that part of 
the world. There is no doubt that "In its effect on Indian attitudes, 
American military aid to Pakistan has been more important perhaps than 
Kashmir itself,1114 for India felt that its very existence was being 
threatened. Nehru demanded the withdrawal of all the Americans serving 
with the United Nations military observers corps on the ground that they 
were no longer neutral, and Secretary-General Hammarskjold insisted that 
they were "denationalized. 1115 Indian leaders pressed for closer rela-
tions with the Soviet bloc, but Nehru did not want to go all the way as 
he did not want to involve India in the cold war. It would seem safe to 
say that "a good deal of Nehru's condemnation of Armed Alliances derived 
from his objection to the United States giving arms to Pakistan and to 
Pakistan's being a member of SEATO and of CENT0. 1116 India's suspicions, 
however, were eased only in March 1956 when Pakistan pressed the SEATO 
Council to seek a settlement of the Kashmir question, but the Council 
went no further than urging both parties to reach an early peaceful 
13Ibid., pp. 192-195. 
14Taya Zinkin, "Indian Foreign Policy," World Politics, VII (1955), 
p. 191. 
15Korbel, .22.• ~·, pp. 163-164. 
16Walter Crocker, Nehru (New York, 1966), p. 89. 
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settlement. 
Pakistan, on several occasions, tried to get the United Nations to 
act without any practical results. On 24 January 1957, the Security 
Council again called for a general plebiscite and sent Gunnar D. Jarring, 
the Swedish President of the Council, on a mission to the area that fared 
no better than the previous ones. Later that same year the Council once 
more sent Dr. Frank Graham, but India this time insisted that the plebis-
cite was Qnrealistic so long as India had ratified the State's accession. 
The Indian Defense Minister, Krishna Menon, considered the Council's re-
1 
quest an infringement on India's sovereignty: "The Security Council.is 
telling India what it can have in its constitution, because if we are to 
follow this, surely we have to amend the Indian constitution because the 
Security Council has asked us to do so. 1117 
The question again came before the Security Council on April 27, 
1962. By 1962 the Kashmir dispute had become increasingly vital to 
Pakistan's as well as India's defense. Afghanistan and the Pakhtunistan 
separatist movement were threatening the Pakistani border, while China 
was spilling over the Indian Himalayan border. Pakistan took this op-
portunity to arrive at an understanding with China. In 1961 Pakistan 
formally proposed the demarcation of the boundary between Chinese Sin-
kiang and Pakistani Kashmir, and with China's agreement the boundary was 
formally demarcated. China seems to have tried to neutralize Pakistan 
before the Chinese advance into Ladakh in 1962, and to keep Indian forces 
tied up on the Pakistani border out of fear that Pakistan would move in-
to Kashmir. Since 1962 China and Pakistan have drawn closer and have 
17 (S/PV 765, January 24, 1957), p. 51. 
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concluded a number of agreements, such as the trade agreement of January 
1963 and the cultural agreement of 1965. 
The Chinese attack in 1962 forced India to reappraise its non-align-
ment policy and turn to the West, especially the United States, and the 
closer India's relations with the West became and the more weapons the 
United States sent to India, the closer Pakistan came to China. In 1962, 
the Great Powers were faced with the threat of a general war that would 
have upset the whole balance of power and the status-quo in that part of 
the world. They could not afford renewed hostilities over Kashmir, and 
felt this would have adversely affected not only Western Ladakh but all 
of Kashmir and both India and Pakistan. Accordingly they appealed to 
both parties to renew their efforts to reconcile their differences. By 
the end of November 1962 negotiations started between India and Pakistan 
and lasted till the beginning of 1963 but without producing any tangible 
results. 
Pakistan took the case again to the Security Council in January 1964. 
India, having recovered from the shocking and humiliating war with 
China, pleaded that the dispute had ceased to exist and that there was 
nothing left to negotiate. Britain, -which proposed negotiations, was ac-
cused by Nehru of betraying India and he threatened to withdraw from the 
Commonwealth. In fairness to Nehru, it must be said that the Sino-
Indian conflict kindled the fire of nationalism in India and made it ex-
tremely d~_fficul t for Nehru to make any significant concessions to Pakis-
tan. In addition, Pakistan itself was flirting with China at the time 
China was attacking India, and this irritated the Indians. Alarmed by 
the massacres in Bihar and Orissa in March 1964 and the rising pressure 
of communalism, Nehru had Sheikh Abdullah released in April, after eleven 
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years in jail, and arranged for a meeting with President Mohammed Ayub 
Khan in June. Nehru's initiative came late, for he died in May. 
Once again the attention of the world was drawn to the Kashmir dis-
pute when Sheikh Abdullah upon his release went on a tour abroad and on 
his return to India was arrested. The new Shastri Government, still un-
clear about its position at home, could not take the risk of allowing 
Sheikh Abdullah to challenge India. Sheikh Abdullah's statements during 
his visits to Cairo, London, Paris, and Algiers, particularly his meet-
ing with Chou En-lai in Algeria while the Afro-Asian Conference was in 
session, provoked the Indian Government.18 
Hardly had the Rann of Kutch dispute,19 which in April 1965 brought 
India and Pakistan to the brink of a full fledged war,·been brought under 
control, when in August 1965 the conflict between India and Pakistan 
over Kashmir took a violent turn. India claimed that the so-called free-
dom fighters were "infiltrators" from Pakistan and that Pakistan,. by 
sending them in, had violated the cease-fire line. Pakistan denied hav-
ing sent any "infiltrators," and said that the so-called "infiltrators" 
were the people of ~shmir who had risen in revolt. 20 On August 25 the 
18He attacked the Indian policies toward, the full integration of· 
Indian Kashmir intq the Indian Union without reference to the will of 
the people and held that only a free and impartial plebiscite could de-
termine the status of the state as·a whole. 
19rt is a territory of 3,500 square miles forming the northern part 
of the Rann State and was, for more than a century, the subject of a 
dispute between the Kutch State and the Province of Sind. This dispute 
was bequeathed to India and Pakistan by their predecessor, the British 
Indian Government. In 1948 Pakistan.laid claim to this area.· The · 
Indian Government after independence claime.d that the whole 'of the Rann 
formerly belonged to the State of Kutch and hence became a part ·of India 
when the state acceded to it in 1947. 
20(S/PV 1240, September 18, 1965), p. 11. 
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Indian forces crossed the cease-fire line in the State of Jammu and Kash-
mir at two points in retaliation against the infiltrations. Fighting 
continued and, on September 6, l.965, the Indian forces cro~sed the inter-
national frontier between India and West Pakistan and attacked the city 
of Lahore. Thereupon President Mohammed Ayub Khan announced that Pakis-
tan was at war with India and declar~d a state of emergency in Pakistan. 
The entire armed forces of the two countries were locked in combat. 
At an emergency meeting of the Security Council, on September 6, 
the Pakistani representative accused India of armed aggression and denied 
the Indian accusation that Pakistan had violated the international border 
south of the cease-fir~ line between the State of Kashmir and West Pakis-
tan.21 A resolution jointly sponsored by the non-permanent members.of 
the Security Council was unanimously adopted the same day. It called on 
both India and Pakistan to observe a cease-fire in the entire area of 
conflict and withdraw their armed forces to the positions held by them 
before August 5, 1965. It also requested the Secretary-General to take 
the necessary action to put the resolution into effect, strengthen the 
United Nations military observers, and keep the Council informed. The 
Security Council action was a natural outgrowth of its request for a 
cease-fire. The Secretary-General, U-Thant, was given the role of media-
tor to ease tension in·a troubled area, a role in the field of pacific 
settlement of international disputes which has been greatly developed by 
Hammarskjold, the man who developed the so-called "preventive diplomacy" 
in an effort to ease tensions and bring the parties together to work out 
an agreement on major differences. 
21 (S/PV 1238, September 6, 1965), pp. 13-15. 
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On the basis of the resolution, U-Thant visited India and Pakistan. 
He held talks in New Delhi and Rawalpindi with the Prime Minister of 
(j, 
·~ 
India and the President of Pakistan and, following his return to New York 
on 16 September 1965, he had a series of talks with the United Nations' 
Representatives of India and Pakistan. Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin 
also offered the g?od offices of the Soviet Union to both countries. On 
September 22 the Security Council, with all the five permanent members 
concurring, ordered a cease-fire and both parties agreed to observe it. 
The cease-fire agreement was not solely the result of the mediatory 
efforts of the Secretary-General, as pressure by the Great Powers on both 
parties to avoid any escalation in the war also played its part. Devel-
opments in South-East Asia and the growth in Chinese Communist action in 
the part of the world made the Great Powers, including the Soviet Union, 
take keen interest in the Indo-Pakistani war. The Chinese on 16 Septem-
ber sent an ultimatum to the Indian Government "to dismantle all military 
structures along the Sikkim border" in three days, or else feel the 
"grave consequences. 11 22 Many in the United States feared that Chinese 
help to Pakistan would upset the international scene and bring America 
to India's side, thus the danger of a world conflagration was evident. -
The Chinese ultimatum made the Great Powers feel apprehensive and made 
the United Nations move fast in.adopting the cease-fire resolution.· The 
Economist, in analyzing, the situation, pointed out that both the United 
States and the Soviet Union knew that prolonging the war in the sub-con-
tinent would serve China's special interest in causing confusion south 
22Time, September 24, 1965, p. 32. 
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of the Himalayas. 23 Pressure was applied to both India and Pakistan to 
have them end the war. On September a, United States Secretary of State, 
Dean Rusk, announced the United States Government's decision to suspend 
the shipment of military supplies to India and Pakistan. He added, "If 
these two countries could find peace with each other the sub-continent 
could be impregnable from the point of view of defense and safety •••• 1124 
It would appear that "moral sympathy for Pakistan was brushed aside in 
the general desire to put out the flames before China was in there chuck-
ing the paraffin around. 1125 That is why "the Administration in Washing-
ton is carefully not using the word plebiscite. 1126 The United States, 
after a reappraisal of its policy in that part of the world, renewed its 
previous invitation to the Heads of Governments of India and Pakistan to 
visit the United Stat.es. President Mohammed Ayub Khan accepted the invi-
tation and arrived in Washington in December 1965. The United States 
was in a position to use pressure in support of the United Nations as 
the massive volume of American aid to both countrie~ provided the United 
States with some power to help the United Nations bring about a cease-
fire. 
The Soviet Union this time added its efforts to those of the United 
States to end the war. On 4 September, the Soviet Prime Minister, Alexei 
Kosygin, addressed identical messages to President Mohammed Ayub Khan 
and Prime Minister Shastri, urging them to stop the fighting and resort 
23
~Economist, September 25, 1965, p. 1177. 
24 U.S. Government, Department 2!_ State Bulletin, Washington, Sept-
ember 27, 1965, p. 54. 
25
~ Economist, ~· !:!!.•, p. 1178. 
26 Ibid., p. 1203. 
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to peaceful means to settle the Kashmir dispute, and he offered the good 
offices of the Soviet Union if both sides deemed it useful. On Septem-
ber 7 an official statement by~ said that 
The armed conflict between India and Pakistan evokes 
serious concern in the Soviet Union •••• The concern is in-
creasing because the conflict is passing /correct7 in an 
area neighbouring on the frontiers of the-Soviet-Union. 27 
Tass went on to remind the two parties of the grave consequences of pro-
longing the war, which it said would be in the interest of foreign for-
ceso28 ~, considering the Sino-Soviet conflict, could possibly have 
meant China as one of those foreign forces. It seems that the Soviet 
Union's attitude toward the war and its desire to stop it stemmed from 
factors still applicable to the present-day situation and this has help-
ed to maintain the status-quo in that part of the world. Briefly, these 
factors are~ the Soviet Union's proximity to the Indo-Pakistan sub-con= 
tinent; its policy of peaceful coexistence with the West; its fear that 
the present East-West detente is not permanent; its fear of war because 
the political and ideological reasons would see the Soviet Union siding 
with China; the Sino-Soviet ideological split over who is the champion 
of world Communism; and the Soviet's fear of the growing influence of 
the Chinese in the sub-continent which, with all probability, would· .. · 
threaten its border. This situation brought about strange parallels in 
the United States and the Soviet Union's policies. For the first time 
the Soviet Union offered its good offices in a dispute like this. On 
the invitation of the Soviet Union, Indian Prime Minister Shastri and 
Pakistani President Mohammed Ayub Khan met in Tashkent early in 1966 and 
27 (S/6671, September 8 1 1965), p. 2. 
28Ibid. 
produced the Taskent Declaration in which the two parties agreed to a 
truce and the withdrawal of their armed forces to the 1949 cease-fire 
line. 
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This marked the end of the last and present phase of the Kashmir 
str~ggle which added another chapter to the joint United Nations and 
Great Powers efforts toward a peaceful settlement of an international 
dispute and peaceful change. In this case it only amounted to a "per-
petuation" of the status-quo. The United Nations had to limit itself to 
this for the circumstances of the case made it,conclude that only the 
status-quo is a guarantee of peace until such time as peaceful settle-
ment is reached,- This is a case study of United Nations' action under 
its powers of peaceful settlement of international disputes and provides 
a model for the study of the power politics within and outside the 
United Nations. Within this framework the dispute served to prove that 
"Small power aggression can never be a serious problem to the peace of 
the world if the Great Powers agreed among themselves to deal with it. 11 29 
29J. s. Brierly, ~~2fNations (New York, 1963), p. 386. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCJ;..USION 
The maintenance of international peace and security is the United 
Nations' most important function and its success or failure will be 
judged by the degree of success achieved in this endeavor. It is neces-
sary to consider the record of the United Nations in dealing with inter-
national disputes and, of the many international disputes dealt with by 
the United Nations, I have used the Kashmir issue as a case-study of 
how the United Nations operates in this field of peaceful settlement. 
The United Nations system for pacific settlement of international 
disputes requires members to seek a solution by any one of the prescrib-
ed peaceful means they choose. Article 33, Paragraph 1, of the Charter 
provides that "The parties ••• shall, first of all, seek a solution by 
negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peace-
ful means of their own choice." These steps enumerated do not follow in 
a rigid sequence but are a range of possibilities to be utilized as ,ap-
propriate and feasible. 
Thus, upon the failure of negotiations held between India and Pakis-
tan late in 1947, both parties, in an effort to break the impasse and 
reach a pacific settlement, invoked Article 35 of the Charter of the 
United Nations. Within the sphere of power prescribed to it in dealing 
with international disputes, the United Nations responded by employing a 
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wide variety of techniques in an effort to bring about a peaceful settle-
ment of the Kashmir dispute. The first step was an attempt to facili-
tate constructive negotiations between the two parties and, at the same 
time, the United Nations, playing the role of a third party, explored 
all the divergent views and considered all the available possibilities 
to bridge the gap separating the two parties' views. 
To that end and acting within the spirit of Chapter VI of the United 
Nations Charter, the Security Council recommended to both parties proced-
dures of adjustment and terms of settlement it considered appropriate 
for working out a settlement. Thus the Security Council came out with 
its resolution of 21 April 194-8, which did not tell the parties in the 
dispute what to do but merely recommended an approach it hoped would 
lead to a peaceful settlement. The resolution was not intended to be 
the final act of settlement, but what the members of the Council consid-
ered to be the most effective way of dissuading India and Pakistan from 
aggravating the situation in Kashmir and a means of encouraging them to 
compromise their differences on the fundamental issues so as to arrive 
at a common ground for agreement. Thus the Kashmir Commission, whose 
scope, method, and competence were prescribed under the April resolution, 
was created for the purpose of mediation and conciliation and without 
the power to impose its recommendations or plans. It was as such limit-
ed in its activities to only personal, face-to-face contacts with the 
officials of the parties concerned and to recommending to them different .. 
plans and methods backed by the Commission's power of persuasion and its 
political prestige. In the final analysis, the applicability of such 
plans and methods has to depend on the agreement of both parties and 
their good will. 
101 
In pursuance of its role under pacific settlement of international 
disputes, the Security Council not only intentionally avoided taking 
sides in the dispute, but also refused to pass judgment. It neither con-
demned, as requested by India, Pakistan as an aggressor, nor did it sit 
down to consider the legal issues involved in the dispute. This need 
not surprise us, as the conflict was essentially political, and had the 
Council considered it a legal question, like the legality of the acces-
sion, then it should, under Article 96 of the Charter, have requested 
"~he International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion." This 
juridical approach would have naturally concluded that one party was 
wrong while the other was right, and, one may argue, the Council would 
then have the crucial legal fact before it and would be in a stronger 
position to make appropriate recommendations, This is not that simple 
because the fact that neither India nor Pakistan invoked the jurisdiction 
of the Court indicates that both did not consider it a justiciable issue, 
Due to the nature of the dispute, a juridical verdict would not have con-
stituted a settlement. Both countries have avoided a juridical consid-
eration of the dispute, for to them the dispute is so vital that it does 
not allow th~m to take any risk that might weaken anyone's position in 
the dispute. 
Furthermore, the Council itself did not invoke the jurisdiction of 
the International Court of Justice, because a legal decision as to who 
was right or wrong would, with all probability, have impeded all efforts 
toward a mutual compromise settlement and would have introduced a rigid 
situation that does not lend itself to negotiations and a political com-
promise. The Council felt the most it had to hope for was a political 
compromise based on political realism; the realism of Indo-Pakistani 
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relations, the changing world situation, and the powers and limitations 
of the Council, rather than the fundamentals of pure abstract justice. 
The Council, itself a political body, relied heavily on its institution-
al mechanics and the diplomatic skills at its disposal. Its policy ap-
pears to have been based on the view that a measure of success toward a 
settlement by negotiation and mediation is better than getting nowhere 
by a juridical verdict. "The United Nations may not have achieved the 
ideal balance between legal and political approaches to pacific settle-
ment, but it has been on sound ground in rejecting primary reliance upon 
the device of adjudication. 111 
Both India and Pakistan had appealed to the United Nations under 
Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations; that is under Chapter 
VI which deals with pacific settlement of international disputes, rather 
than Article 39 of Chapter VII which deals with threats to the peace and 
acts of aggression. This explains why the Security Council could not 
entertain the Indian insistence of having Pakistan branded an aggressor 
and why the United Nations for twenty years persisted in regarding the 
Kashmir question as a "situation" or a ''dispute" rather than an "act of 
aggression" under Article 39 of the Charter. It is not clear why India, 
which kept insisting that Pakistan had committed an act of aggression, 
did not request United Nations' action under Article 39. This might 
have been a technical error on the part of the Indian officials, but 
whatever the reasons behind it may be, the fact remains that had India 
considered aggression to have been the real issue, she should have ap-
pealed to the United Nations Security Council in the manner prescribed 
1c1aude, 2E.• 2!.·, p. 215. 
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in Article 39 of Chapter VII of the Charter, 
It is worth mentioning here that Nehru, the avid advocate of brand-
ing Pakistan with aggression, himself opposed a similar treatment for 
China on the basis that it would embitter Red China and make it impossi-
ble to reach a settlement of the Korean War by negotiations. Nehru was 
trying to secure a political triumph for India in Kashmir and this illus-
trates so well how statesmen can preach in international relations what 
they do not practice when it comes to matters involving their national 
interests, Naturally, this poses a real problem for the United Nations 
whenever it is called upon to embark on the pacific settlement of inter-
national disputes, 
A big question is the Security Council's failure to take the initia-
tive and deal with the whole question under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
Both parties have stressed the gravity of the situation and accused each 
other of aggression in Kashmir. The Security Council had the power to 
act under Chapter VII by claiming that the situation was a potential 
danger to international peace and security. Had the Security Council 
done so the two parties would have been obligated to abide by the de-
cision of the Council, 
It seems the Council decided against such a move mainly out of fear 
that such action instead of producing permanent results would obstruct 
the possibility of any peaceful settlement in the future. International 
accusation, or what Inis Claude calls "international finger-shaking11 2 
is a very serious thing and its use is not advisable for promoting the 
settlement of disputes between states, States despise being censured by 
2Ibid., p. 219. 
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any organization and would never under normal conditions assent to what 
is imposed on them against their will. In addition, the Council is also 
aware _of the fact that the United Nations as yet is not equipped to im-
pose a decision on the disputants by force, even if it decides such ac-
tion is desirable. What is more, enforcement measures are always sub-
ject to the threat of the Big Power veto. It might be argued that at 
the early stages of the .·:dispute the Soviet Union was disinterested in 
the whole question, and would not have used its veto power as it di_d not 
want to harm its relations with either India or Pakistan. This is mere 
speculation and there was always the possibility of a veto, Soviet or 
otherwise. Another reason for the United Nations' cautious treatment of 
the Kashmir dispute and the reluctance to take any resolute measure 
under Chapter VII was the United Nations' continued involvement in other 
equally important international disputes, namely the Palestinian, Indon-
esian, and Czechoslovakian questions, and later Korea, Congo and others. 
For all these reasons it appeared more advisable for the United Nations 
to rely on its mediation powers and skills. 
It follows that the roles of the United Nations Commission, General 
McNaughton, Sir Owen Dixon, and Dr, Frank Graham, were merely mediatory 
without any right to impose a decision or their own solution as a final 
solution. They were all devices sent to that troubled area for varying 
periods of time as United Nations presences, and symbolized the United 
Nations' interest and involvement in maintaining peace whereever a trou-
bled international situation exists. Each performed high level politi-
cal and administrative functions on behalf of the organization by making 
personal contacts with the Indian and Pakistani authorities and recom-
mending what they thought to be reasonable and appropriate as a basis. 
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for agreement~ They proved to be instrumental in freezing the unsettled 
situation which was the best action short of a solution dictated by for-
ce. Hostilities were brought to a stop and the basis was laid out for 
direct negotiations between the two parties to settle the outstanding 
issues. The issues are such that they do not lend themselves to a per• 
manent settlement by the pacific methods at the disposal of the Unitedv .. 
Nations so it was for both governments to try to work out· a settlement. 
That is why Sir Owen as well as Dr •. Graham recommended direct negotia-
tions between the leaders of India and Pakistan. 
Differences on fundamental issues are the same in 1967 as they were 
in 1948. Both want the State; Pakistan for economic, defensive and 
ideological ·reasons; India more for defensive a.nd ideological reasons 
than for economic reasons. Pakistan believes that a fair over-all pleb-
iscite under United Nations auspicies would result in a decision in its 
favour and that while certain districts in Jammu might favour India, yet 
the total vote would cancel them out. Whenever the legality of Pakis-
tan's presence :in Kashmir is questioned it counters this by questioning 
the Maharajah's accession to India late in 1947• charging conspiracy and 
describing India's acceptance of the accession as "fraudulant." As to 
the subsequent accession by the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. Pakistan, 
denounces the Assembly as an improperly elected body. India. on the 
other hand. stresses the illegality of Pakistan's support of the tribal 
invasion and its later presence and actions in the State, and demands 
the question be settled before any other is considered. and hopes that. 
following this_Pakistan would evacuate the section of the State it now 
holdso The "Azad" Kashmir Government would cease to exist and 'the Indi= 
an supported Government of the State would be recognized. 
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With the two states standing at the two ends of the pole, the United 
Nations rightly felt it should restrict itself for the time being to the 
most urgent problem; namely, the cessation of hostilities in order to 
ensure the minimum prerequisites of peace between India and Pakistan. 
The United Nations, by accepting the realities of the situation and its 
complications, by . realizing that the roots of the dispute go deep in the 
economic, religious, and cultural make-up of the sub-continent. and by 
having failed to induce a compromise settlement, found itself conce~tra-
ting its eforts on the last possible alternative left to it in the cir-
cumstances; namely, the stoppage of the fighting. This was in other 
words pacification without a solution. The United Nations worked hard 
to ease the tension and to freeze the situation, and in so doing has con-
tributed to the present stagnation and the development of a status-quo 
situation. It is clear therefore that the United Nations did not settle 
the main issues of the dispute nor bring about a permanent settlement of 
the Kashmir question. 
It appears that the United Nations' peace-keeping operations in 
Kashmir as they were backed by Great Powers' collective action have of 
necessity been limited to restoring a fragil peace and maintaining the 
status-quo. Recently Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg warned that peace 
keeping operations must not "be a sofa to provide a comfortable respite 
from efforts at peaceful settlement" but should "be a springboard for 
accelerated efforts to eliminate the root causes of conflict. 113 It has 
been argued that if the Security Council is in possession of the power 
3Robert o. Matthews, "The Suez Canal Dispute: A Case Study in 
Peaceful Settlement," International Organization XXI (1967), p. 79. 
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to enforce solutions of disputes, many questions might be prevented from 
ever reaching a fighting stage, and that to the extent the Security Coun-
cil is able to compel resort to arbitration or judicial processes. the 
final settlements might be more in accordance with law and justice. As 
it is, the voluntary procedures of pacific settlement now in use a?'e · - --
largely based on political compromise which may or may not produce "just" 
solutions. The very existence of the power to enforce solutions might 
mean that solutions could be reached more quickly by voluntary proced• 
ures of pacific settlement, 
It has to be admitted that compulsory procedu:-es might not safe- -
guard what nat-ions regard as their rights of sovereignty or that unde?' 
international compulsory procedures an individual country would be as-
sured protection of what it considers to be its ''national interest" or 
"honour"; yet the present Charter provisions with respect to pacific···.· 
settlement reflect a very important fact that states at San Francisco 
were on the whole reluctant to surrender what they hold to be their "vi-
tal interests," their political independence" and "honour", to the cus-
tody of other nations or an international agency and that, barring the 
development of a strong and operative United.Nations force, lasting 
solution·s of disputes between sovereign states can only be achieved by 
the consent of the parties. 
We must not expect the United Nations to be other than what it was 
intended to be and what is is: a voluntclry association of s9vereign 
states. When countries feel that ''national interest" is at stake as -
India and Pakistan clearly do, they have a tendency not to abide by any 
United Nations resolution they deem to l:>e contrary to their "national--
interests",. and unless the Great Powers working together are willing to 
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exercise their power through the United Nations, the success of United 
Nations' actions remains doubtful. The effectiveness of the United Na-
tions in any given situation will ultimately depend upon the agreement 
of the Great Powers to channel their combined efforts within the organi-
zation to attain this objective. Evidence of this can be seen in the 
last major outbreak between India and Pakistan, as the unity displayed 
by the Great Powers in the Security Council provided the basis for all 
the restraints used to stop the fighting. 
The same forces and conditions which operated within and outside 
the United Nations to keep the status-quo are still there. Indo-Pakis-
tani differences on the main issues of the dispute are still in exist-
ence, but the Great Powez,s in the Council have the same unchanging in-
terest in keeping the situation under control by trying to eliminate all 
the causes which produce errup~ions. The Security Council is no longer 
"! 
pressing for a plebiscite, and there is no certainty that a plebiscite 
will ever be held. Furthermore I the Counc._il, being aware of the complex 
background of the problem, does not underestimate the probability of new 
disturbances in case a plebiscite is held ·at this time. 
How is it that the Kashmir question has not been taken off the agen-
da of the Security Council and placed on the agenda of the General Assem-
bly? The General Assembly does not have the coercive powers of the Se-
curity Council. Yet it could appeal to both parties to demilitarize the 
state and if the parties refuse to comply the Assembly could then pro~ 
pose the arbitration of the fundamental differences. What would make-cus"-
believe that the parties would agree to . this? This substantiates the - __ 
basic concept of pacific settlement of international disputes; that is, 
there are many ways to pacific settlement, but all of them depend on the 
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presence of good will and mutual cooperation. Failing this a peaceful 
settlement would not be assured. 
In summing up, an impartial third party has an all-important role 
to play in efforts to achieve pacific settlement of disputes. This has 
been the unique contribution of the United Nations in the field of peace-
ful settlement of international disputes and peaceful change. Its con-
stant endeavor to negotiate, explope, and press,.for possible· common 
grounds for agreement, guided in this by an "impartiality" which is the 
product of the multiplicity of the n~tions represented, have contributed 
to a cooling-off effect on international disputes. This is clearly the 
case of the Kashmir dispute where the United Nations devised one pro-
cedure after another for the purpose of finding out a possible basis for 
a truce agreement with the hope that force would then no longer appear 
as a feasible alternative. 
The United Nations efforts have also proved to be a practical way 
for focusing on the disputants the moral pressure of world opinion, The 
debates and negotiations have exercised a powerful influence on the pro-
tagonists by mobilizing world opinion against their excessive views, 
thus making them avoid actions that would ~ake either of them responsi-
ble for the deterioration of the situation. On the other hand, the non-
publicized diplomacy which takes place within the United Nations provides 
an additional element of value: the.mediating influence of all those who 
are vitally interested in peace, while free from an immediate involvement 
in the issues at stake in terms of prestige or national interest. In the 
Kashmir dispute debate and negotiations did take place; the proposals 
advanced were directed toward arriving at a mutually acceptable solution; 
and the threat of forceful coercion was not used by the United Nations 
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to back up its mediation efforts. The results again showed that States 
are normally more cooperatively disposed when they know that no solution 
will be imposed on them against their will. 
Nations are obliged by the Charter not to resort to force in solv~ 
ing their disputes. The United Nations did not and can not abolish the 
use of force, at least in its present make up, by compelling the nations 
of the world to live at peace. It only provides the organizational ma= 
chinery that could be used to facilitate peace but it is not by itself 
a guarantee of peace. Those who were disturbed because the United Na-
tions did not use force to halt the events of late August and early Sept-
ember 1965 in Kashmir must have bee,n thinking of an organization other 
than the United Nations, for in the United Nations the ultimate decision 
is up to the national governments. 
But the United Nations can inform, it can appeal, it can per-
suade, it can maintain contact between hostile states, it 'can 
voice the world's will to peace. This is its true vocation 
in the struggle for world security. Its struggle will not 
depend on the strength of its 'teeth' as on the responsive-
ness of its members to its reconciling mission. 4 
Under the auspicies of the United Nations, the nations of the world 
are l~ying out their problems as never before. ' The United Nations pro~ 
vides a platform and an auditorium where nations could air out their dif= 
ferences and cool off their temper. The proposition that it is better 
for statesmen to argue than to fight is embedded in the foundations of 
international organization and in the hope that debate may eliminate the 
need and the will to fight. The United Nations offers to statesmen the 
ways and means of identifying the central problems of international life. 
In the present era the international stage is becoming increasingly 
4Jacob and Atherton, ,2£.• cit., p. 321. 
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occupied wjth new players, and with this the complexities of world poli-
tics are growing. In this situation, the existence of the United Nations 
is of vital significance to world peace. It provides a forum within 
which national foreign policies may be adjusted on agreed terms, subject 
to the realities of the political forces within and outside the organi-
zation and to the degree that states are prepared to abdicate their uni--
lateral role in inter~ational affairs. 
Given our international system as it is 1 can we expect the United 
Nations to have a will of its own regardless of what the parties want? 
This. is a problem which is aggravated by the nations' interpretation of 
the role of the United Nations, the importance and power of the parties 
involved in dispute, and whether they are committed to any of the world 
forces in this divided world. The Kashmir problem does not seem to be 
an exception. Whatever action the United Nations has taken seems to 
have been the only possible and feasible action in the over-all situa-
tion •. 
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APPENDIX A 
The letter of accession, dated October 26, 1947. 
"My dear Lord Mountbatten, 
"I have to inform Your Excellency that a grave emergency has risen 
in my State and request the immediate assistance of your Government. 
As Your Excellency is aware, the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not ac-
ceded to either the Dominion of India or Pakistan. Geographically my 
State has a common boundary with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
and with China. In their external relations the Dominions of India and 
Pakistan can not ignore this fact. I wanted to take time to decide to 
which Dominion I should accede or whether it is not in the best inter-
ests of both Dominions and of my State to stand independent, of course 
with friendly and cordial relations with both. I accordingly approached 
the Dominions of India and Pakistan to enter into a standstill agreement 
with my State. The Pakistan Government accepted this arrangement. The 
Dominion of India desired further discussion with representatives of my, 
Government. I could not arrange this in view of the developments indi-
cated below. In fact the Pakistan Government under the standstill agree-
ment is operating the post and telegraph system inside the State. Though 
we have got a standstill agreement with the Pakistan Government, that 
Government permitted a steady and increasing strangulation of supplies 
like food, salt and petrol to my State. · 
"Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes with modern 
weapons have been allowed to infiltrate into the State, at first in the 
Poonch areas, then from Lialkot and finally in a mass in the area adjoin-
ing the Hazara District on the Ramkote side. The result has been that 
the limited number of troops·at the disposal of the State had to be dis-
persed and thus had to face the enemy at several points simultaneously, 
so that it has become difficult to stop the wanton destruction of life 
and property and the looting of the Mahura power house, which supplies 
electric current to the whole of Srinagar and which has been burnt. The 
number of women who have been kidnapped and raped makes my heart bleed. 
The wild forces thus let loose on the State are marching on with the aim 
'°of capturing Srinagar, the summer capital of my Government, as a fi.I>st 
st~p to overrrunning the whole state. The mass infiltration of tribes-
men drawn from distant areas of the No?>th-West Fl'ontier Province, coming 
?>egularly in motol' trucks, using the Mansehra-Muzaffarabad road and 
fully a?'!Ded with up-to-date weapons, can not possibly be done without the 
knowledge of the P!'ovincial Government of the North-West Fl'ontier PJ:,o--
vince and the Government of Pakistan. In spite of ?>epeated appeals made 
by my Gove?>nment no attempt has been made to check these raiders O!' to 
stop them fr,om coming into my State. In fact, both the radio and the 
press of Pakistan have reported these occurrences. The Pakistan radio 
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even put out the story that a provisional government has been set up in 
Kashmir. The people of my State, both Muslims and non-Muslims, general-
ly have taken no part at all. 
"With the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great 
emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for 
help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they can not send the help 
asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I 
have accordingly decided to do so, and I attach the instrument of acces-
sion for acceptance by Your Government. The other alternative is to 
leave my State and the people to freebooters. On this basis no civiliz-
ed government can exist or be maintained. This alternative I will never 
allow to happen so long as I am the ruler of the State and I have life 
to defend my country. 
"I amy also inform Your Excellency's Government that it is my inten-
tion at once to set up an interim government and to ask Sheikh Abdullah 
to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister. 
"If my State is to be saved, immediate assistance must be available 
at Srinagar. Mr. v. P. Menon is fully aware of the gravity of the sib.1:,.;. 
ation and will explain it to you, if further explanation is needed. 
"In haste and with kindest regards, 
Your Sincerely, 
(Signed) Hari Singh." 
Quoted in: White Paper ~Jammu ~ Kashmir, pp. 46-48. 
APPENDIX B 
Lord Mountbatten's reply, dated October 27, 1947. 
"My dear Maharaja Hari Singh 
"Your Highness's letter dated 26 October 1947 has been delivered to 
me by Mr. v. P. Menon. In the special circumstances mentioned by Your 
Highness, my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir 
State to the Dominion of India. In consistence with their policy that 
in case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject 
of dispute, the question of accession should .be decided in accordance 
with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish 
that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its 
soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession 
should be settled by a reference to the people. 
"Meanwhile, in response to Your Highness's appeal for military aid, 
action has been taken today to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir, 
to help your own forces to defend your territory and to protect the 
lives, property and honour of your people. My Government and I note 
with satisfaction that Your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdul-
lah to form an interim.,.Government to wo:rk with you:r Prime Minister. 
(Signed) Mountbatten of Bu:rma." 
Quoted in: White Paper ~.Jannnu and Kashmir, pp. 48-49. 
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